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INTRODUCTION 
This Article argues that slavery was a violation of the Takings 
Clause of the United States Constitution.  Slaves, like all people, 
possessed a property right of self-ownership.  When the government 
appropriated that property, through laws establishing slavery, the 
rightful owners of the property—the slaves—suffered uncompensated 
physical, regulatory, and derivative takings.  Victims of slavery, like 
victims of other impermissible takings, are constitutionally entitled to 
just compensation under the Takings Clause.  This Article concludes 
by examining some potential judicial and legislative consequences of 
treating slavery as a Takings Clause violation. 
The history of Blacks1 in America is inextricably intertwined with 
the institution of slavery.  Slavery existed in the colonies for over a 
                                                          
 1. Throughout this Article I will use the term “Black” rather than “black” or 
“African-American.”  Cf. Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:  
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 
1332 n.2 (1988) (“I shall use ‘African-American’ and ‘Black’ interchangeably.  When 
using ‘Black,’ I shall use an upper-case ‘B’ to reflect my view that Blacks, like Asians, 
Latinos, and other ‘minorities,’ constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, 
require denotation as a proper noun.”). 
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century, and for an additional century in the United States.2  After its 
abolition, slavery was replaced by a network of racially oppressive laws 
and legally supported segregation, which allowed and facilitated the 
infliction of further indignity upon Blacks.3 
Since the abolition of slavery, former slaves have sought 
compensation for the harms they suffered.4  Modern scholars and 
advocates have argued in increasing numbers that descendants of 
slaves should receive reparations.5  Politicians have proposed 
                                                          
 2. See AFRICANAONLINE, SLAVERY TIMELINE (providing a comprehensive timeline 
of the history of the institution of slavery and Black history), at 
http://www.africanaonline.com/slavery_timeline.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2003) (on 
file with the American University Law Review). 
 3. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 21-80, 155-90, 571-606 
(4th ed. 2000); Joe R. Feagin & Eileen O’Brien, The Long Overdue Reparations for 
African Americans, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH 417, 418-19 (Roy L. Brooks ed., 
1999). 
 4. Attempts to secure compensation began immediately following 
emancipation.  See RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT:  WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS 
240-41 (1999) (giving an example of a letter from a former slave asking for 
compensation from his former slaveowner and discussing how slaveowners “stole” 
labor and “robbed the future” of slave descendents); Does America Owe a Debt to the 
Descendants of Its Slaves?, HARPER’S MAG., Nov. 2000, reprinted in SHOULD AMERICA PAY?:  
SLAVERY AND THE RAGING DEBATE ON REPARATIONS 79, 101-02 (Raymond A. Winbush 
ed., 2003) [hereinafter SHOULD AMERICA PAY?] (citing a letter from a freed slave to 
his master asking for back wages); id. at 102-03 (providing timeline of reparations 
attempts); see also ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:  AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 
1863-77 68-70, 158-61 (1988) (discussing attempts by the Freedman’s Bureau to 
secure reparations); Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in 
Reparations for Slavery, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 498-99 (2002) (discussing 
congressional proposals to redistribute property to freed slaves after the Civil War); 
F. Michael Higginbotham, A Dream Revived:  The Rise of the Black Reparations Movement, 
58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 447, 450 (2002) (noting that while support for 
reparations began during the Civil War, President Andrew Johnson vetoed 
reparations bills).  Among these early reparation attempts were Sherman’s proposed 
“forty acres and a mule,” the Southern Homestead Act passed in 1866, further 
proposed legislation in 1867, and a $68 million reparations suit filed in 1915.  See 
infra notes 247-248 (discussing the “forty acres and a mule” proposal).  For a 
discussion of these early attempts, see ROBINSON, supra, at 206-07, and SHOULD 
AMERICA PAY?, supra, at 103. 
 5. One of the first modern legal scholars to argue for reparations was Professor 
Boris Bittker of the Yale University Law School.  Professor Bittker, long ambivalent 
about the concept of slave reparations, wrote his groundbreaking book after his 
reparations research convinced him that it wasn’t a “crazy, far-fetched idea.”  See 
BORIS BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (Beacon Press 2003) (1973). 
Several recent law review articles have advocated for reparations.  See generally 
Tuneen E. Chisolm, Comment, Sweep Around Your Own Front Door:  Examining the 
Argument for Legislative African American Reparations, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 677, 687-89 
(1999) (arguing that reparations would bridge the wealth inequality between Blacks 
and whites); Alberto B. Lopez, Focusing the Reparations Debate Beyond 1865, 69 TENN. L. 
REV. 653 (1995) (suggesting that the reparations movement could be strengthened 
by reliance on episodes of racial violence, other than the Civil War, that have 
plagued our nation’s history); Rhonda V. Magee, Note, The Master’s Tools, from the 
Bottom Up:  Responses to African-American Reparations Theory in Mainstream and Outsider 
Remedies Discourse, 79 VA. L. REV. 863 (1993) (arguing that a wealth redistribution is 
necessary in order to achieve racial equality); Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, Wear It:  
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legislation on the matter6 and activists have demonstrated in favor of 
reparations.7  To date, however, all attempts to secure legislative or 
                                                          
An Analysis of Reparations to African Americans, 67 TUL. L. REV. 597 (1993) (stating that 
slavery contributed to “the chain of poverty and powerlessness that is epidemic in the 
African-American community” and that a solution must be created that corrects 
these problems); Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone:  Is it Time to Reconsider the Case 
for Black Reparations?, 40 B.C. L. REV. 429 (1998) (advocating for reparations and 
suggesting that reparations avoid the problems associated with affirmative action); 
Note, Bridging the Color Line:  The Power of African-American Reparations to Redirect 
America’s Future, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1689 (2002) (arguing that the divisive nature of 
the reparations debate can be lessened if reparations are viewed as an means to 
repair the racial divide in America rather than individual compensatory awards). 
The topic was also discussed recently at a symposium at the New York University 
School of Law.  See Symposium, A Dream Deferred:  Comparative and Practical 
Considerations for the Black Reparations Movement, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 447 
(2002) (attempting to “fill the gap” between the theoretical aspects of the 
reparations movements and its practical and concrete considerations). 
A wave of books on the subject have been published recently, among the most 
prominent being Randall Robinson’s book The Debt.  See ROBINSON, supra note 4 
(tracing the history of slavery and advocating for some form of compensation to 
Blacks as a result of slavery’s effects); see also SHOULD AMERICA PAY?, supra note 4 
(presenting a collection of essays, articles, and historical documents that explore the 
many facets of the reparations debate). 
One writer has suggested that society is currently in the fifth of “[f]ive major waves 
of political activism [that] have promoted the idea of reparations for African 
Americans since the emancipation of slaves.”  Chisolm, supra, at 683.  Another 
suggests that society is in “Stage III” of the reparations movement.  Raymond A. 
Winbush, Introduction, in SHOULD AMERICA PAY?, supra note 4, at xi, xii.  Whatever the 
nomenclature, scholars agree that the current impetus for reparations has been 
fueled in part by the publicized successes of other reparation suits, such as suits 
against the United States by Japanese Americans who were interned during World 
War II and suits against European governments by Jewish and other victims of the 
Holocaust.  See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 204-24 (discussing the similarities 
between slaves and Jews during the holocaust in order to advance the argument that 
slaves are entitled to similar compensation); Brophy, supra note 4, at 499 (arguing 
that one factor that led to a discussion about reparation for slavery is the reparations 
of other groups, including “Native Americans, Holocaust victims, Japanese 
Americans interned during World War II, [and] South Africans”); Chisolm, supra 
note 5, at 714-15 (linking Black reparations debate to Japanese American reparations 
claims); Verdun, supra, at 646-55 (suggesting that the United States should admit its 
wrongful behavior in slavery by giving reparations, just as it admitted that it was 
wrong in treating Japanese Americans unfairly during World War II); Winbush, 
supra, at xii (presenting a table of payments made to Holocaust survivors). 
 6. Representative John Conyers (D. Mich.) first introduced a bill in 1989 that 
would have established a commission to study the effects of slavery and recommend 
appropriate remedies.  The bill died in committee, and has been reintroduced (and 
repeatedly killed) every Congress since then.  See H.R. 3745, 101st Cong. (1989); H.R. 
1684, 102d Cong. (1991); H.R. 40, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 891, 104th Cong. 
(1995); H.R. 40, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 40, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 40, 107th 
Cong. (2001); H.R. 40, 108th Cong. (2003).  Representative Conyers has stated, “I 
have re-introduced H.R. 40 every Congress since 1989, and will continue to do so 
until it’s passed into law.”  John Conyers, Jr., Major Issues—Reparations:  The 
Commission to Study Reparations Proposals for African Americans Act, at 
http://www.house.gov/conyers/news_reparations.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2003) (on 
file with the American University Law Review). 
In 1993, the Organization of African Unity (comprised of African governments) 
adopted a resolution asking the United States for reparations.  ROBINSON, supra note 
4, at 218-22.  See also Tamar Lewin, Calls for Slavery Restitution Getting Louder, N.Y. 
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judicial redress have foundered.  Congress has not been willing to 
pass reparations legislation8 and courts have dismissed tort-based 
claims based on statutes of limitations and sovereign immunity 
grounds.9 
Unexplored thus far is the alternative of bringing claims under the 
Takings Clause of the United States Constitution.  The Takings 
Clause governs property owners’ rights to just compensation when 
the government takes their property, stating that “nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”10  The 
clause has spawned volumes of legal writing11 and a considerable 
                                                          
TIMES, June 4, 2001, at A1 (chronicling the momentum of the reparations movement 
and its significant political and legal events). 
In 1997, then-President Clinton made statements suggesting that he was 
considering a national apology for slavery.  However, the idea was eventually 
dropped.  See Steven A. Holmes, Idea of Apologizing for Slavery Loses Steam, at Least for 
Now, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1997, at A15 (discussing that President Clinton put aside the 
idea of a national apology to African Americans after listening to the opinions of 
advisory commission on race relations); cf. Brophy, supra note 4, at 500-01 
(suggesting that the proposed apology for slavery arose due to society entering an 
“age of apology”). 
 7. See Chris L. Jenkins & Hamil R. Harris, Descendants of Slaves Rally for 
Reparations, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2002, at C1 (reporting on the nations first mass 
rally for reparations, attended by thousands of protesters); Courtland Milloy, Cash 
Alone Can Never Right Slavery’s Wrongs, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2002, at C1 (reporting on 
the reparations rally in Washington, DC, and suggesting that the current goal of the 
reparation movement is not money, but rather the “the educating of America about 
slavery”); Conrad W. Worrill, The Millions for Reparations Rally:  A Grand Success 
(noting that more than 50,000 people attended the Washington, DC rally), at 
http://www.nbufront.org/html/BushTelegraph/WorrillsWorld/02_08_23_GrandSu
ccess.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2003) (on file with the American University Law 
Review). 
 8. See ROBINSON, supra note 4 (noting that federal reparations legislation has 
never made it out of committee, and therefore has never garnered serious debate). 
 9. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1-2 (discussing the different defenses that are 
available in takings claims). 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 11. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:  PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (arguing that the Takings Clause raises doubt as to the 
constitutionality of many modern governmental programs, such as zoning, rent 
control, workers’ compensation laws and progressive taxation); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, 
REGULATORY TAKINGS:  LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (1995) (suggesting that the 
public should rely on the free market, rather than the judicial system, to protect 
from uncompensated takings); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 
YALE L.J. 547 (2001) (presenting a framework under which givings, or governmental 
distributions of property, should be analyzed); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, 
and Fairness:  Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. 
L. REV. 1165 (1964) (discussing the utility and fairness of the court-drawn line 
between compensable and non-compensable governmental takings); William 
Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political 
Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995) (arguing that the political process should 
resolve the limits of the government’s taking power and compensation for takings 
should be required only when the political process is not likely to consider property 
claims fairly). 
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amount of case law.12  To go along with ordinary takings, scholars 
have examined areas such as regulatory takings,13 zoning,14 derivative 
takings,15 and variations such as usings16 or givings.17  Some scholars 
have gone so far as to suggest that slave owners might have deserved 
compensation for the government taking—emancipation—of their 
slaves.18  It is surprising, then, that the formidable guns of takings 
                                                          
 12. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (holding that a 
condition to the granting of a redevelopment permit constituted a Takings Clause 
violation because the condition was not reasonably related to the proposed 
development); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (finding that a 
landowner was due compensation under the Takings Clause where a regulation 
rendered his land useless); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Council, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) 
(requiring the state to compensate the appellant because the imposed building 
permit condition constituted a taking); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 
438 U.S. 104 (1978) (holding that the application of New York’s Landmarks Law, 
which prevented the development of Grand Cent. Terminal, did not constitute a 
taking of appellants’ property); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (holding 
that property may be regulated, but that should such regulation go too far, it will be 
recognized as a taking); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 
N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (affirming the governmental taking of private property, 
and its conveyance to a private company when its purposes is to promote the public 
health and welfare). 
 13. See generally FISCHEL, supra note 11 (discussing the doctrine of regulatory 
takings and advancing an economic means by which to determine when a regulation 
becomes a taking that requires just compensation). 
 14. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 263-72 (discussing and giving examples of 
how land use regulation can constitute a taking that requires compensation). 
 15. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 VA. L. REV. 
277, 290-96 (2001) (arguing that uncompensated derivative takings are both 
inefficient and unfair; inefficient because the government is encouraged to exercise 
its eminent domain power even when doing so reduces net social welfare and unfair 
because it does not evenly distribute the cost of public burdens). 
 16. See generally Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077 (1993) (suggesting that 
the Constitution’s Public Use Clause be construed as the basis for a “jurisprudence of 
usings”). 
 17. See generally Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 15 (advocating the taxation of 
givings, which are governmental advantages bestowed upon individual private 
parties). 
 18. This idea was apparently first raised by James Madison.  In a letter to 
abolitionist Robert Evans, Madison wrote that slaves “could not be constitutionally 
taken away without just compensation.”  Letter from James Madison to Robert Evans 
(June 15, 1819), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 439-47 (1910).  See Treanor, 
supra note 11, at 839 (discussing Madison’s letter and its importance to determining 
an original understanding of the Takings Clause); see also id. at 851 (commenting 
further on Madison’s belief that slaveholders were a group particularly threatened by 
unjust majoritarian expropriation of property); A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE 
MATTER OF COLOR:  RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS—THE COLONIAL PERIOD 
136 (1978) (noting the unsuccessful proposal by Gouverneur Morris that the New 
York Constitution abolish slavery as soon as possible, “consistent with . . . the private 
property of individuals”); id. at 94-95 (noting arguments raised in Massachusetts that 
the Constitution should not be read to conflict with existing property rights in 
slaves). 
The view that slaveowners deserved compensation after their slaves were freed was 
also argued by senators who opposed emancipation.  See Lea S. Vandervelde, The 
Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 444 n.41 (1989) (citing 
a statement in the Congressional Record by an opponent of emancipation that 
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scholarship have never trained on one of the greatest 
uncompensated takings in American history:  the enslavement of 
millions of Africans for nearly half the nation’s history, the 
government-sanctioned taking of their property rights of self-
ownership, and the subsequent impoverishment of their 
descendants.19  This Article begins the discussion of slavery as a 
Takings Clause violation.20 
                                                          
uncompensated emancipation would violate the Takings Clause).  For a modern 
discussion of the position that abolition of slavery was theft from slave owners, see, 
for example, YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 105-13 (2d ed. 
1997); Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword:  The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
26, 72 (2000) (“[T]he Thirteenth Amendment itself expropriated legal ‘property’—
that is, slaves—without compensation.”); Sanford Levinson, The David C. Baum 
Memorial Lecture:  Was the Emancipation Proclamation Constitutional? Do We/Should We 
Care What the Answer Is?, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1135, 1149 (2001) (suggesting that the 
provision in the Fourteenth Amendment limiting liability to slaveowners was 
necessary or else “a careful lawyer imbued with respect for the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment might suggest that the United States would indeed have a duty to 
compensate at least some slave owners for the loss of their property”); Carol M. Rose, 
Property and Expropriation:  Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 1, 
24-28 (2000) (arguing that emancipation of slaves was one of a limited number of  
“extraordinary, even revolutionary, disruptions of property rights” in the country’s 
history). 
 19. The only likely rival for the dubious honor of “greatest uncompensated 
taking on American history” would be the genocide and land seizure perpetuated 
against Native Americans.  Cf. Rose, supra note 18, at 30-37 (arguing that the taking 
of land from Native Americans, like the emancipation of slaves, was also an 
“extraordinary” taking). 
Two other major takings targeted at minority groups—the government seizure of 
Mormon property in the late nineteenth century, and the World War II era 
confiscation of property belonging to Americans of Japanese ancestry—were smaller 
in magnitude and involved fewer victims.  See generally Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the 
Bottom:  Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 363-68 
(1987) (discussing government oppression, including the confiscation of property, of 
Americans of Japanese ancestry); Nathan B. Oman, Book Review, The Story of a 
Forgotten Battle:  Reviewing the Mormon Question:  Polygamy and Constitutional Conflict in 
Nineteenth Century America, 2002 BYU L. REV. 745, 750-51 (2002) (discussing 
government harassment of Mormons, including the taking of Mormon church 
property). 
 20. There does not appear to be any other treatment of this subject, either in 
articles, books, or non-legal publications.  Only a few other sources even obliquely 
hint at the idea.  For example, Harper’s Magazine conducted an interview with four 
attorneys on legal theories of reparations, and one potential theory which was 
mentioned in passing (and quickly dismissed) was a potential suit under the Takings 
Clause for recovery of the “forty acres and a mule” promised to freed slaves after 
emancipation.  See Does America Owe a Debt to the Descendants of Its Slaves?, supra note 4, 
at 83 (suggesting that voiding of the forty-acres promise by President Andrew 
Johnson could be compensable under the Takings Clause); see also infra notes 242-
243 and accompanying text (discussing the “40 acres and a mule” proposal).  
Reparations scholars have also suggested that slave descendants might have takings 
claims if the government improperly extinguished any vested tort claims for 
reparations they possessed.  See Jon M. Van Dyke, Reparations for the Descendants of 
African Slaves, in SHOULD AMERICA PAY?, supra note 4, at 57, 61-62 (stating that slave 
descendants’ “claim for reparations based on the slave experience [is] a property 
claim, protected by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution”).  The 
argument that slaves would have a takings claim if the government extinguished their 
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The first step in arguing that slavery was a Takings Clause violation 
is to establish that slaves, like other people, had a property interest in 
their persons—a property right of self-ownership.  Part I of this 
Article examines the sources and characteristics of that property 
right.  The second step is to examine the institution of slavery to 
determine whether it can be reconceptualized as a taking of the self-
ownership property rights of slaves.  Part II of this Article discusses 
the different ways slavery can be conceived as a taking. 
Potential constitutional endorsement of slavery is a serious obstacle 
to viewing slavery as a taking.  This problem is addressed in Part III, 
which concludes that any constitutional acceptance of slavery is not 
fatal to takings claims, especially given the strong parallels between 
the purpose of the Takings Clause and the facts of the slavery taking.  
Thus, Parts I through III establish that slavery should be considered a 
Takings Clause violation.  Slavery contains the basic requirements for 
a takings violation, and any problems arising from characteristics 
unique to slavery are not fatal.  Part IV then describes the prima facie 
takings case. 
After making the case that slavery is a Takings Clause violation, Part 
V discusses potential effects of this conclusion in both judicial and 
legislative forums.  Advocates bringing a takings claim in court could 
avoid some of the problems that have bedeviled traditional 
reparations suits, such as government sovereign immunity.21  
Conservative courts, which have been receptive to takings claims over 
the past century, may prove more amenable to these property-based 
claims for compensation than they have been towards tort-based 
reparations claims.  In addition, the takings argument provides added 
support to convince legislators to provide compensation to 
descendants of slaves.  Finally, Part VI summarizes what takings claims 
add to the reparations debate, and shows why there is much to be 
                                                          
tort compensation claims is of course substantively different than the argument that 
slavery itself was a Takings Clause violation. 
Carol Rose also hints at the potential taking, but leaves it unexplored, in her 
discussion suggesting that emancipation was a taking: 
Unquestionably, the institution of slavery depended on a prior 
expropriation—that is, of the slaves’ bodies from themselves—a fact that 
certainly acted as a justification for emancipation.  Nevertheless, once the 
institution of slavery was established, slaves represented a substantial capital 
investment for their owners, who could and did argue that uncompensated 
emancipation was an unconstitutional taking of their property. 
Rose, supra note 18, at 24-25.  Although recognizing in passing the taking of slaves’ 
rights involved, Rose does not explore this taking in any greater detail. 
 21. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing how the sovereign immunity 
defense does not apply to takings claims). 
WENGER.AUTHORCHANGES2A.DOC 2/23/2004  2:20 PM 
2003] SLAVERY AS A TAKINGS CLAUSE VIOLATION 199 
gained from recognizing that slavery, in addition to its many other 
characteristics, was also a national violation of the Takings Clause. 
I. SLAVES POSSESSED A PROPERTY RIGHT OF SELF-OWNERSHIP 
The first step in showing a Takings Clause violation is to establish 
the existence of the property right involved:  self-ownership.  Section 
A of this part examines the right’s origin, Section B discusses the 
characteristics of that right, and Section C considers whether the 
right of self-ownership is a constitutionally protected property right. 
A. A Conceptual Foundation 
Philosophers have long discussed the idea that bodily integrity may 
be an independent property right.  Some scholars have called the 
idea of a self-ownership right “possessive individualism.”22  While 
possessive individualism includes several slightly different strands of 
thought, the underlying idea is that each individual is “the proprietor 
of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them.”23  
This argument was made by John Locke, who famously stated: 
Though the earth, and all inferior creatures be common to all 
men, yet every man has a property in his own person. This nobody has 
any right to but himself.  The labour of his body, and the work of 
his hands, we may say, are properly his.  Whatsoever then he 
removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he 
hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his 
own, and thereby makes it his property. . . .  For this labour being 
                                                          
 22. See CRAWFORD B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE 
INDIVIDUALISM:  HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962) (suggesting that problems associated with 
modern liberal-democratic theory have their roots in a seventeenth century notion of 
possessive individualism, which suggests that a person is “essentially the proprietor of 
his own person or capacities” and owes nothing to the larger social whole); see also 
JOSEPH H. CARENS, DEMOCRACY AND POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM:  THE INTELLECTUAL 
LEGACY OF C. B. MACPHERSON (1993) (responding and critiquing the concept of 
possessive individualism as defined and analyzed by MacPherson); JULES TOWNSHEND, 
C. B. MACPHERSON AND THE PROBLEM OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2000) (synthesizing and 
defending the philosophical and political critiques of MacPherson’s democratic 
theory of possessive individualism and advocating for the incorporation of his 
principal into modern social theory). 
Possessive individualism draws from Hobbes as well as Locke.  MACPHERSON, supra, 
at 3-4.  Possessive individualism has influenced modern property law discussion.  For 
example, some scholars have used it to justify the existence of intellectual property 
law.  One commentator writes that “the concept of ‘authorship’ and the term 
‘author’ had acquired special weight by 1710 through their association with the 
theme of ‘possessive individualism’ in general social thought.  John Locke’s version 
of individualism at least implicitly identified the individual’s proprietorship over 
himself as a function of ‘authorship.’”  Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright:  The 
Metamorphoses of “Authorship”, 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 469-70 (1991) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 23. MACPHERSON, supra note 22, at 3. 
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the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can 
have a right to what that is once joined to . . . .24 
This statement is consistent with other arguments made 
throughout Locke’s writings.25  One of Locke’s similar statements is 
that a man’s property includes his “Life, Liberty and Estate.”26  By 
including life and liberty as elements of property, Locke in turn 
incorporates his expansive conceptions of those terms into the idea 
of property.27  And for Locke, a primary purpose for the very 
existence of government was the protection of this fundamental 
interest in property, which, if defined as used earlier in the same 
treatise, includes self-ownership.28  The right of self-ownership is 
                                                          
 24. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 128 (Mark Goldie ed., 
Everyman 1993) (1690) (emphasis added).  See generally Jeffrey S. Koehlinger, 
Substantive Due Process Analysis and the Lockean Liberal Tradition:  Rethinking the Modern 
Privacy Cases, 65 IND. L.J. 723, 758-59 (1990). 
 25. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 26 (James H. Tully 
ed., William Popple trans., 1983) (1689) (arguing that civil interests include “Life, 
Liberty, Health, and Indolency of Body”); LOCKE, supra note 24, at 204 (defining 
property as that “which men have in their persons as well as goods”). 
Extension of Lockean principles to cover slaves is probably not something Locke 
envisioned.  See William M. Wiecek, The Origins of the Law of Slavery in British North 
America, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1711, 1768-70 (1996) (discussing Locke’s authorship of 
the pro-slavery Carolina constitution); cf. LOCKE, supra note 24, at 125-27 (discussing 
property ownership in a servant’s labor); MACPHERSON, supra note 22, at 215-17 
(discussing Locke’s conception of labor of servants).  However, Locke did make 
several fierce critiques of slavery, including a rhetorical denunciation that begins the 
first Treatise on Government.  See LOCKE, supra note 24, at 5 (“Slavery is so vile and 
miserable an estate of man, and so directly opposite to the generous temper and 
courage of our nation; that ‘tis hardly to be conceived, that an Englishman, much 
less a gentleman, should plead for it.”). 
 26. LOCKE, supra note 24, at 157. 
 27. For example, Locke’s writings on liberty state that man has “a liberty to 
dispose, and order, as he lists, his person, actions, possessions, and his whole 
property, within the allowance of those laws under which he is; and therein not to be 
subject to the arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own.”  Id. at 142. 
Similarly, there is some overlap between the idea of self-ownership in one’s 
property right, and bodily integrity as a life right.  One commentator has written, “if 
life means what it did when the Framers drafted the Constitution, bodily integrity is 
part and parcel of the concept.”  Sheldon Gelman, “Life” and “Liberty”:  Their Original 
Meaning, Historical Antecedents, and Current Significance in the Debate over Abortion Rights, 
78 MINN. L. REV. 585, 588 (1994).  That author argues that the Framers believed that 
life, rather than liberty, was “the most basic right”; and “this life include[d] more 
than mere biological existence; it also encompasses physical integrity, health and 
indolency of body, and even a minimum quality of life.”  Id. (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
 28. Locke wrote that “[t]he great and chief end therefore, of men’s uniting into 
commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of 
their property.”  LOCKE, supra note 24, at 178.  In Watson v. Branch County Bank, one 
commentator, regarding this passage, wrote: 
John Locke defined “property” to include the sum of the individual’s legally 
cognizable attributes, “that is, his Life, Liberty and Estate.”  When he wrote, 
“The great and chief end . . . of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, and 
putting themselves under Government, is the Preservation of their Property,” 
Locke was referring to this broad conception of property. 
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subject to certain limitations in Lockean theory; for example, one’s 
property right in oneself is not alienable.29 
The Framers of the Constitution were acutely aware of Locke’s 
writings, and Locke’s ideas influenced them in drafting the 
Constitution and its amendments.30  Statements made by James 
Madison seem to indicate that he espoused this idea of a property 
interest in one’s own body.  He argued that property “embraces 
everything to which a man may attach a value and have a right.”31  
While Locke was not the only philosopher or writer to influence the 
Framers,32 there is little reason to doubt his influence; his strong ideas 
on self-ownership are not contradicted by other major influential 
figures of the time.33  In fact, a similar statement was made by Chief 
Justice John Marshall, who wrote: 
                                                          
380 F. Supp. 945, 968 n.19 (W.D. Mich. 1974), rev’d on other grounds, Watson v. 
Branch County Bank, 516 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1975) (internal citations omitted). 
 29. Locke’s statement that “every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no 
Body has any Right to but himself” can be read to support the inalienability of self-
ownership.  LOCKE, supra note 24, at 305-06. 
 30. See, e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE & MICHAEL DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 70-
72 (1991) (asserting that Locke’s theories on natural rights provided a basis for the 
Framers’ views on private property); Joseph Becker, Procrustean Jurisprudence:  An 
Austrian School Economic Critique of the Separation and Regulation of Liberties in the 
Twentieth Century United States, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 671, 679 (1995) (noting that 
Jeffersonian and Lockean natural law theory greatly influenced the Framers of the 
Constitution); Koehlinger, supra note 24, at 731-35 (asserting that Locke’s liberal 
traditions inspired the prominent leaders of the United States during its early 
history). 
 31. James Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, in 14 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON 266-68 (1983); Becker, supra note 30, at 679 (noting that Madison’s 
views on property extended to such things as one’s opinions and beliefs). 
 32. Gordon S. Wood has suggested that the Framers, though steeped in a 
Lockean conception of property, were moving beyond that conception by the 1780s.  
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 219 (1998).  
If true, this would make less compelling the notion that the Framers meant to enact 
a Lockean conception of property into the Takings Clause.  However, Wood argues 
that this conception was widely held prior to the framing; thus, if the Framers had 
wished to exclude a Lockean concept of property, they might have been expected to 
do so explicitly. 
William Treanor has also argued that Locke had less of an influence on the 
Framers than Epstein and others have suggested, positing, “Epstein’s equation of 
Lockean ideology with the political thought behind the Takings Clause is incorrect.  
While it would be wrong to say that Locke had no influence on the founding 
generation, it is equally incorrect to describe Lockean liberalism as the ideology of 
the framing.” Treanor, supra note 11, at 824. 
 33. For example, Jeremy Bentham’s idea that property relies on the stability 
engendered by the protection of investment-backed expectations dovetails well with 
the existence of property rights of self-ownership.  JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF 
LEGISLATION 111-13 (C.K. Ogden ed., 1931) (1802)  (“The idea of property consists 
in an established expectation; in the persuasion of being able to draw such and such 
advantage from the thing possessed . . . .”). 
In addition, self-ownership seems implicit in Bentham’s account of how self-
interest gives rise to societal regimes of property protection.  This idea is in turn 
drawn from Hume’s theory on property, which was based on security.  DAVID HUME, 
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That every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own labour, is 
generally admitted; and that no other person can rightfully deprive 
him of those fruits, and appropriate them against his will, seems to 
be the necessary result of this admission.34 
To be clear, these statements express an ideal of self-ownership, 
which some of the Framers, due to racial prejudices, may not have 
felt extended to Blacks or slaves.  For example, Marshall owned 
slaves35 and Locke drafted the pro-slavery Carolina constitution.36  
However, despite any prejudices, what these writers actually 
articulated was an ideal of self-ownership that, when examined free 
from racist ideas, seems to apply equally to Blacks, including slaves. 
Numerous legal commentators and philosophers have similarly 
advocated the recognition of some form of self-ownership.37  
Margaret Radin writes, “the body is quintessentially personal property 
because it is literally constitutive of one’s personhood.”38  Others have 
suggested expanding the principle; famously, Charles Reich 
suggested granting property protection to government benefits.39 
                                                          
A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 542 (Ernest C. Mosser ed., Penguin Books 1969) 
(1739) (“Our property is nothing but those goods, whose constant possession is 
establish’d by the laws of society; that is, by the laws of justice.”). 
 34. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 120 (1825).  But cf. Guyora Binder, 
The Slavery of Emancipation, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 2063, 2068 n.28 (1996) (suggesting 
that Marshall slightly overstated Locke’s argument). 
Despite his eloquent language, Marshall sanctioned the slave trade in The Antelope, 
based on a belief that positive law overruled the natural law principle.  See 23 U.S. at 
120 (“That [slavery] is contrary to the law of nature will scarcely be denied.”); see also 
Binder, supra, at 2077-81 (discussing Marshall’s opinion as an example of “the 
interpenetration of the critique and legitimation of slavery in antebellum American 
culture”). 
 35. Samuel R. Olken, Chief Justice John Marshall in Historical Perspective, 31 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 137, 160 (1997). 
 36. See Wiecek, supra note 25, at 1768-70. 
 37. See Carole Pateman, Self-Ownership and Property in the Person:  Democratization 
and a Tale of Two Concepts, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 20, 22-27 (2002) (noting numerous 
statements by diverse philosophers accepting a principle of self-ownership); see also 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 53-60 (1995) (arguing that 
as a system is “vastly inferior to a position of self-ownership.”); THOMAS D. MORRIS, 
SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619-1860, at 32-33 (1996); ROBERT NOZICK, 
ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 171-72 (1974); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 177-83 (1990). 
 38. Margaret Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 966 (1981) 
[hereinafter Radin, Property and Personhood].  Radin suggests that the tort of assault is 
based on this property interest:  “Interference with my body is interference with my 
personal property.”  Id. 
 39. See Charles Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare:  The Emerging Legal 
Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965) (relating social welfare to self-ownership and 
discussing how to protect that welfare); Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 
733, 786-87 (1964) (arguing that government benefits must be considered a property 
right in order to protect the individual from totally discretionary government 
power).  These two articles by Reich were cited by Justice Brennan in his opinion in 
Goldberg v. Kelly, which held that removal of welfare rights was subject to 
constitutional constraints.  397 U.S. 254, 265 n.8 (1970) (citing Reich’s articles as 
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Self-ownership can be viewed as simply ownership of one’s physical 
body and bodily integrity.40  Legal scholars widely accept this 
minimum definition of self-ownership.41  A more expansive definition 
would view self-ownership as ownership of one’s liberty—less about 
direct ownership of one’s body, and more about ownership of the 
ability to make choices.42  In that sense, the right of self-ownership 
can be seen as related to the constitutional rights of privacy and of 
familial integrity.43  Under either a limited or an expanded right of 
self-ownership, slaves were the owners of that right.44 
                                                          
support for the proposition that “[i]t may be realistic today to regard welfare 
entitlements as more like ‘property’ than a ‘gratuity.’”).  If government benefits are a 
property right, then ownership of one’s body—a more important interest—should be 
considered a property right as well. 
 40. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld stated that bodily integrity was a type of in rem 
property right.  Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1918), reprinted in WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, 
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 85 (Walter 
Wheeler Cook ed., 1964).  Hohfeld also felt that individual liberty, and even rights of 
consortium and personal privacy, could be conceived as in rem property rights.  Id.; 
see also Thomas Merrill & Henry Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 773, 782 (2001) (noting that Hohfeld believed that in rem rights related to both 
tangibles and intangibles). 
 41. See, e.g., BARZEL, supra note 18, at 113 (“The current prohibition of slavery 
implies that each individual is the owner of the capital asset embedded in himself or 
herself.”); EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at vii (theorizing that property law encompasses 
rights that people have both in themselves and in external things).  Cf. Radin, 
Property and Personhood, supra note 38, at 965 (suggesting that Lockean analysis shows 
self-ownership in the physical body); Margaret Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. 
L. REV. 1849, 1905 (1987) [hereinafter Radin, Market-Inalienability] (arguing that a 
person cannot have free will if they are subject to commodification).  But see Michelle 
Bourianoff Bray, Personalizing Personalty:  Toward a Property Right in Human Bodies, 69 
TEX. L. REV. 209, 220 (1990) (arguing that there is currently no defined legal 
position regarding property rights in the human body). 
 42. Self-ownership can also be seen as a right to one’s morality—that decisions a 
person makes will reflect her choices.  See EPSTEIN, supra note 37, at 53 (equating self-
ownership with autonomy); Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 41, at 1885-86 
(discussing self-ownership as individual control).  In this sense, self-ownership is not 
unlike the ownership of one’s own soul.  See generally RICHARD SWINBURNE, EVOLUTION 
OF THE SOUL (1997) (discussing concept of the soul in modern civilization). 
Self-ownership is also, in a sense, ownership of one’s identity, including one’s 
racial identity.  Cf. Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 
1724-37 (1993) (critiquing the proposition that “American law has recognized a 
property interest in whiteness”). 
 43. See generally Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (finding 
that an ordinance that limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single 
family, but defined family to exclude grandchildren, intruded on family sanctity and 
was unconstitutional on due process grounds); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 
(1973) (holding that state anti-abortion laws violated plaintiff’s right to personal 
liberty); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (finding an implicit right 
to privacy in the penumbra to the Bill of Rights to the Constitution that includes that 
right to use birth control); see also id. at 502 (White, J., concurring) (underscoring 
that the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right to marry and raise a family).  But 
cf. Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 620-23 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (holding that 
prisoners do not have a right to procreate). 
 44. But cf. Binder, supra note 34, at 2093-94 (suggesting that self-ownership is a 
WENGER.AUTHORCHANGES2A.DOC 2/23/2004  2:20 PM 
204 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:191 
B. Characteristics of the Self-Ownership Right 
The property right of self-ownership has two salient characteristics:  
it is universal and it is inalienable.  These characteristics result in an 
unusual treatment of the self-ownership right under property law.  
This Section examines these characteristics and how they relate to the 
treatment of slavery under the takings clause.   
1. Universality 
Self-ownership is universal because it derives from the self, and all 
people have a self.  Philosophers who discuss the existence of self-
ownership agree on its universality.45  The universality of self-
ownership is a natural derivative of the principle of equality:  All 
people, being equal, have self-ownership.46  The acceptance of this 
principle by the Framers is suggested in the Declaration of 
Independence, which states, “all Men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that 
among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness.”47  The 
universality of self-ownership has a long philosophical history. 48  As 
applied to the discussion of slavery, the universality of self-ownership 
means that every slave possessed this property right. 
2. Inalienability 
The property right of self-ownership is inalienable.  That is, unlike 
many other property rights that may be freely traded, bought, sold, or 
otherwise commodified, the right of self-ownership can never be 
                                                          
spectrum and denying that enslavement fully encompassed that spectrum). 
 45. See MACPHERSON, supra note 22, at 231-35 (noting that an essential part of 
Locke’s individualism is the notion that every person is “the absolute proprietor” of 
his or her own person); Pateman, supra note 37, at 22-27 (noting that self-ownership 
is a standard term that is widely accepted and needs no further explanation). 
 46. See Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 38, at 965-66 (exploring the 
notion that if one owns one’s body, then everyone has self-ownership rights). 
 47. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).  Similarly, Article 1 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states:  “All human beings are born 
free and equal in dignity and rights.”  G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. I, U.N. Doc. A/810 
(1948), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/ (on file with the American 
University Law Review).  
 48. See LOCKE, supra note 24, at 287-88 (noting that “every man” possesses self-
ownership); MACPHERSON, supra note 22, at 229-35; Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual 
Property:  Old Boundaries and New Frontiers, 76 Ind. L.J. 803, 807-09 (2001).   To the 
extent that self-ownership includes a right to make choices, a right to enjoy the 
benefits of one’s good choices and the consequences of harmful choices, it is akin to 
the soul, which has traditionally been of universal character.  See generally ETIENNE 
GILSON & THOMAS LANGEN, MODERN PHILOSOPHY:  DESCARTES TO KANT 62-72 (1963) 
[hereinafter MODERN PHILOSOPHY] (describing Cartesian conception of the 
universality of the soul). 
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severed from its source, the person.49  Inalienability of personhood is 
important because the alternative, commodification, can have 
deleterious effects.50  Commodification of the self, according to 
Radin, “undermines personal identity by conceiving of personal 
attributes, relationships, and philosophical and moral commitments 
as monetizable and alienable from the self” and does “violence to our 
deepest understanding of what it is to be human.”51  Such 
depersonalization is avoided through the use of an inalienability 
rule,52 the use of which is consistent with the philosophical 
                                                          
 49. Margaret Radin writes that inalienability depends upon “the notion of 
alienation as a separation of something—an entitlement, right, or attribute—from its 
holder.”  Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 41, at 1852.  See Andrew Koppelman, 
Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 480, 491 
(noting that Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911), held that thirteenth amendment 
personal liberty rights are inalienable). 
Not all scholars accept the idea of inalienability of personhood.  See Guido 
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:  One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111-12 (1972) (arguing that personhood 
is alienable as evidenced by society’s valuation of personal attributes and moral 
commitments, among other things); see also Richard Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 
85 COLUM. L. REV. 970, 971-72 (1985) (suggesting that alienation should only be 
restrained where required by harmful externalities).  If self-ownership is to be 
considered alienable, as these scholars have suggested, then the taking of self-
ownership should be a compensable taking like the taking of other alienable 
property. 
 50. Commodification is a process of assigning an economic value to an item.  
Radin argues that personhood, or self-ownership, should not be subject to 
commodification.  Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 41, at 1905-15. 
 51. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 39, at 1905-06.  Another writer notes: 
Complete alienability over one’s body, however, may negatively affect 
personhood.  An individual’s integrity is affected negatively by being 
discussed in market rhetoric as a fungible commodity, because such 
terminology ignores the unique qualities and differences between 
individuals.  For example, many commentators object to pornography 
because it reifies and commodifies women.  Women become sex objects, 
rather than sexual individuals, who have a monetary value based on their 
appearance or sexual repertoire.  Similarly, recognizing body parts as fully 
alienable property would encourage the perception of body parts as 
interchangeable commodities and undermine the recognition of the human 
body as the physical embodiment of the personality. 
Bray, supra note 41, at 241 (citations omitted). 
Recent debates have touched on the issue of payment for another’s reproductive 
ability.  Another debate has emerged over controversial offers to pay crack addicts, 
who are mostly Black, to be sterilized.  See Cecilia M. Vega, Sterilization Offer to Addicts 
Reopens Ethics Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2003, at B1 (describing the ethical concerns 
about paying men and women for sterilization). 
 52. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 41, at 1905-15 (proposing that personal 
identity is undermined when one views personal attributes such as politics, work, 
religion, sex, and moral commitments as commodified objects rather than integral 
components of oneself); see also Bray, supra note 41, at 241 (proffering that the law 
should recognize the noncommodification of the human body and adopt 
approaches that will protect the personal significance of potential property such as 
reproductive or sexual services). 
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foundations of the concept of self-ownership.53  This approach avoids 
dangers such as economic coercion that may arise from alienability.54 
The inalienable nature of the self-ownership property right is not 
the same as a person’s property right in removed body parts, which 
some courts have deemed to be alienable property.  Moore v. Regents of 
the University of California55 held that deceptive removal of fluids and 
spleen from a patient was not conversion.56  The Moore majority found 
that the plaintiff’s claim failed because no “ownership or right of 
possession” was interfered with, despite the taking of his body parts 
without his informed consent.57  Similarly, courts have been divided 
on the alienability of reproductive matter.58 
Scholars have debated the importance and application of 
alienability.59  Notwithstanding the differing views on alienability of 
body parts or reproductive material, it seems clear that the right of 
self-ownership over one’s contiguous body is not affected.  A person’s 
                                                          
 53. See supra Part I.A (demonstrating that Locke’s idea of self-ownership included 
inalienability). 
 54. See Bray, supra note 41, at 242 (asserting that an exchange of monetary 
compensation for body parts will unduly compel individuals to sell their bodies, thus 
further dividing society into classes based on wealth). 
 55. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
 56. Id. at 488-89. 
 57. Id. 
 58. In a series of decisions pertaining to a probate case, the California appeals 
court noted that frozen sperm was not normal personal property.  Hecht v. Superior 
Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the probate court had 
jurisdiction over the decedent’s frozen sperm because decedent’s interest in the 
sperm gave rise to a property interest), rev’d, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1996) (holding that the plaintiff was entitled to her husband’s frozen sperm after his 
death).  For background on the case, see Keith Sealing, Teaching Fundamental 
Learning Techniques with Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 46 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 755, 770-72 (2002).  However, in an unusual disposition, the court found that 
the sperm was property only as to the decedent’s girlfriend, since only she could use 
it.  Hecht, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 227.   
In another case dealing with reproductive material, a court refused to enforce a 
contract granting a divorced wife custody and use of viable frozen pre-embryos, 
finding that standard property and contract rules did not apply where a man might 
become a parent against his will.  A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057 (Mass. 2000).  
Finally, there is some debate in whether a self-ownership right includes the right to 
end one’s own life.  See Roger Friedman, It’s My Body and I’ll Die if I Want To:  A 
Property-Based Argument in Support of Assisted Suicide, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
183 (1995).  These and the many other cases and articles on the topic are interesting 
and reflect the difficulty courts have experienced in dealing with these complicated 
issues.  However, these cases are neither controlling nor particularly applicable in the 
context of slaves’ self-ownership rights. 
 59. For example, the holding in Moore has been widely criticized.  See, e.g., Bray, 
supra note 41, at 238-39 (arguing that Moore is bad policy because it failed to 
“affirmatively delineate individuals’ interest in their bodies”); Jennifer Lavoie, Note, 
Ownership of Human Tissue:  Life After Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 
75 VA. L. REV. 1363 (1989) (arguing that the Moore decision to treat human tissues as 
property and subject to the tort of conversion was problematic in that it violates 
established regulations, case law, and legislation). 
WENGER.AUTHORCHANGES2A.DOC 2/23/2004  2:20 PM 
2003] SLAVERY AS A TAKINGS CLAUSE VIOLATION 207 
property right of self-ownership is qualitatively different than rights to 
body parts or reproductive material.60 
The inalienability of the right of self-ownership distinguishes it 
from other property rights in ways that are highly relevant when 
analyzing slavery.  For example, one potential obstacle for bringing a 
takings claim—the possibility of third-party ownership—is rendered 
moot because of the inalienable nature of the right of self ownership. 
Another potential obstacle for bringing a takings claim—the 
possibility of third-party ownership—is also rendered moot because 
of the inalienable nature of the right of self-ownership.  That is, if 
self-ownership were a type of normally alienable property, it might be 
necessary to inquire whether slaves themselves held ownership of this 
property or whether it had been previously transferred to third 
parties such as kings or rulers.61  The inalienable nature of self-
ownership obviates the need for any such inquiry. 
Importantly, inalienability does not preclude compensation for 
wrongful takings.  While the Takings Clause may seem designed to 
compensate the loss of alienable property, it does not distinguish 
                                                          
 60. The Moore court based its holding on the fact that the cells were no longer 
part of Moore’s person: 
Since Moore clearly did not expect to retain possession of his cells following 
their removal, to sue for their conversion he must have retained an ownership 
interest in them.  But there are several reasons to doubt that he did retain 
any such interest.  First, no reported judicial decision supports Moore’s 
claim, either directly or by close analogy.  Second, California statutory law 
drastically limits any continuing interest of a patient in excised cells.  Third, 
the subject matters of the Regents’ patent—the patented cell line and the 
products derived from it—cannot be Moore’s property. 
Moore, 793 P.2d at 488-89 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).  Without 
such a limitation, extension of Moore might pose a problem for the entire theory of 
self-ownership.  After all, if the government can take a spleen without compensation, 
then why not a kidney, a leg, a heart, or even an entire body?  This kind of slippery-
slope parade of horrors was invoked by a Moore dissenter, who compared the taking 
of Moore’s organs to slavery.  Id. at 515 (Mosk, J., dissenting).  See also Radin, Property 
and Personhood, supra note 38, at 966 (arguing that it is “appropriate to call parts of 
the body property only after they have been removed from the system”). 
 61. As unpleasant as such a possibility sounds today, it could certainly be a legal 
possibility.  Legal history shows the existence of this structure.  For example, under 
Roman law, families were under the almost complete dominion of the head of the 
family, typically the patriarch.  The head of the family had power over the children, 
including selling them into slavery to satisfy his debts.  See generally Lisa S. Morin, 
Roman Family Law and Traditions (describing the Roman patriarch’s rights and total 
control over the family), available at http://bama.ua.edu/~morin002 (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review).  Similarly, slaves’ 
original property rights may have resided in a family head, a head-of-state, or other 
third party. 
In addition to recognizing an inalienable right of self-ownership, there are other 
ways to avoid third-party ownership problems.  For instance, if the right of self-
ownership was considered alienable, its original owner would of course be the slave 
himself.  Under such a scenario, it might be possible to trace a chain of title and 
show a taking. 
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between alienable and inalienable property.  Nothing in the nature 
of inalienability prevents property owners whose property was 
wrongfully taken from seeking redress.  If anything, compensation is 
more appropriate for the greater harm of taking inalienable property.  
Given society’s decision, as embodied in the Takings Clause, to 
regularly compensate for takings of entitlement protected by a 
property rule, compensation should be granted a fortiori for takings of 
entitlements protected by the stronger inalienability rule.  In such 
cases, compensation does not compromise the underlying 
entitlement, but rather constitutes recognition of a wrong.62  Such 
one-time compensation is unlikely to lead to commodification or 
future markets in self-ownership, and thus is consistent with 
characterizing personhood as inalienable. 
C. Self-Ownership as Constitutionally Protected Property 
The Supreme Court has emphasized that all takings claimants must 
show that they possessed a constitutionally protected property 
interest, an exercise complicated by the lack of a definition within the 
Constitution for the term “property.”63  To further complicate 
matters, the Court has been inconsistent on how constitutional 
property is to be defined.  On the one hand, the Court stated that, 
“Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.  
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing 
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such 
as state law . . . .”64  Such language suggests that state law would 
                                                          
 62. See Matsuda, supra note 19, at 394-95 (discussing the appropriateness of 
monetary reparation for wrongdoing).  The government should not have the power 
to turn people into slaves, but given that it did, it should at the very least 
acknowledge the wrong by paying compensation.  In this instance, compensation is a 
punishment meant to express outrage at the act, not a statement that the act can be 
easily “paid for” in cash.  Cf. id. at 395 (suggesting that monetary reparations cannot 
make up for past wrongs, but rather have a symbolic function in recognizing the 
harm).  Such punishment, like punitive damages, may appropriately be greatly in 
excess of the actual harm caused, in order to signal the state’s belief that the 
behavior must be prevented.  The harm of slavery is clearly the enslavement itself, 
not the mere failure to compensate.  See Anthony J. Sebok, Reparations, Unjust 
Enrichment, and the Importance of Knowing the Difference Between the Two, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 651, 657 (2003) (“What was wrong about slavery . . . was not . . . that they 
were not paid.  What was wrong about chattel slavery is rooted in the ideology of 
racial oppression.”). 
 63. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 
885, 888 (2000) (noting that before the Court entertains whether a property interest 
has been taken, it first analyzes whether a claimant has a cognizable interest in such 
property); id. at 891 & n.20 (citing commentators suggesting that the meaning of 
“property” in the takings context is not well defined); EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 22 
(suggesting how to define property since it is not defined in the Constitution). 
 64. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (holding that state law failed 
to substantiate that a college professor had a protected interest in continued 
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determine whether a property right existed.65  On the other hand, the 
Court has also suggested that a federal standard exists, writing that 
“[t]he hallmark of a constitutionally protected property interest is the 
right to exclude others.”66 
Although the Court has been less than clear on how the two 
standards interact,67 self-ownership is protected under either 
standard.  As property over which the owner has the right to exclude 
others, self-ownership is protected under the federal standard.  
Under the state law approach a more complicated analysis seems to 
be required.68  However, given the broad philosophical support for 
self-ownership discussed above, self-ownership could be considered 
one of the common law “background principles of property law” 
which are assumed to be constitutionally protected property interests 
under state law.69 
II. RECONCEPTUALIZING SLAVERY AS A TAKING 
Part I established the existence of a constitutionally protected 
property right of self-ownership.  This Part examines whether slavery 
can accurately be called a taking of that property right.  Section A 
contains preliminary inquiries on whether slavery was a property 
institution and on whether the same government exists today as 
existed at the time of the taking.  Section B addresses how slavery fits 
into the different branches of takings law:  physical takings, 
                                                          
employment with his employer, and as such, the employer did not violate the 
professor’s due process rights by not giving reasons for their decision not to re-hire 
him); see also Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 163-68 (1998) (noting that 
the Constitution does not create property interests, but instead protects such 
interests that are created by an independent source such as state law). 
 65. See FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 66 (arguing that, under Takings Clause analysis, 
state law sources establish what constitutes a cognizable property interest). 
 66. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
666, 673 (1999). 
 67. See Merrill, supra note 63, at 895-915 (discussing the incongruity of these 
different standards). 
 68. A state-by-state analysis of property law would be quite complicated and is 
beyond the scope of this Article.  Among the complicating factors are that numerous 
states did not exist at the adoption of the Takings Clause; each state has its own 
takings clause, adopted at different times, and including different protections; and 
each state has different case law on takings. 
In addition to the parsing of various state laws required to establish legal 
standards, any allocation of slaves to different states would be a terribly complicated 
project.  For example, slaves often moved in interstate commerce and thus were 
subject at times to the laws of one state, and at times to the laws of another; some 
states which were created from parts of other states or other nations; some states 
existed as federal territories. 
 69. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 168.  It seems unlikely that any state law specifically 
proscribed the recognition of slaves’ self-ownership. 
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regulatory takings, and the theoretical areas of derivative takings and 
givings. 
A. Preliminary Inquiries 
There are two areas of preliminary inquiry.  The first is whether 
slavery was an institution of property at all, or simply a system of 
contracts; and the second is whether the government entity that 
existed during slavery can be considered the same government entity 
as exists today. 
1. Determining whether slavery constituted an institution of property or 
contract 
Takings compensation is only available for interference with 
property.  No taking would lie if slavery was a system of contracts70 or 
other laws.71  This Section analyzes whether slavery is properly 
considered a property institution. 
                                                          
 70. Even if slavery was viewed as an institution of contract, there might be reasons 
why the Takings Clause would trigger.  Commentators have suggested that Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), which held that a condition 
requiring property owners to grant the public an easement across their beachfront 
property constituted a compensable taking, was actually a case involving a bargain 
and exchange.  The Supreme Court took exception to the “terms of [the] trade” and 
mandated compensation because “the ‘bargain’ between the coastal commission and 
Nollan was so one-sided as to be unconscionable.”  FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 58.  The 
same can be said of slavery; if indeed slavery involved a contract between owners and 
slaves, the bargain involved was also “so one-sided as to be unconscionable” and 
would thus merit takings compensation.  Id.  Epstein makes a similar point in 
analyzing whether or not freedom of contract ought to allow one to enter into a 
contract of slavery.  See RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS 20 n.6 (1992) (stating 
that the idea of allowing self-sale into slavery is a “very hard question” since such sales 
would likely be “tainted with incompetence, fraud, and duress”); NOZICK, supra note 
37, at 331 (allowing for “voluntary” slavery entered into by contract). 
 71. There is some evidence that at least some slaves had their legal status 
changed through operation of the criminal law.  For instance, many Blacks were 
sentenced to slavery in Africa and sold to traders as punishment for criminal 
offenses.  See ADU BOAHEN ET AL., TOPICS IN WEST AFRICAN HISTORY 108-10 (2d ed. 
1986); cf. David Galenson, Indentured Servitude, in DICTIONARY OF AFRO-AMERICAN 
SLAVERY 351 (Randall M. Miller & John David Smith eds., 1988) (stating that more 
than 300,000 convicts were sentenced to transportation to America and sold as 
indentured servants).  However, in the case of slaves, often this “criminal” 
punishment was completely arbitrary, with new crimes punished retroactively in 
proportion to a slave trader’s needs.  Id.  This suggests that many “criminal” cases 
would not pass muster in the American legal system, where generally, in the absence 
of the violation of a known criminal law, there is no punishment.  This is the criminal 
law maxim of nula poena sine lege.  See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 590 
(E.D.N.Y. 2002) (discussing the history of the legal maxim nula poena sine lege that 
recognizes that states may only punish people for committing a crime if a statute 
authorizes such punishment before the crime is committed). 
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a. Similarities to indenture and peonage 
One might be tempted to characterize slavery as a system of 
contract because slavery has historically been connected with 
indenture, and indentured servants entered into their indentures 
through contracts.72  Additional evidence of slavery as a contract 
regime might be adduced from the legal treatment of peonage, 
which replaced slavery in many areas after emancipation and has 
been termed “de facto slavery.”73  Legally, peonage, which 
commentators find so similar to slavery, was treated as a contract 
regime.74 
Slavery, however, differed from both indenture and peonage in a 
very important respect.  Slavery was a system of in rem rights—that is, 
vaguely defined rights enforceable against a large body of 
undetermined parties—and such rights have traditionally been 
associated with property.75  In contrast, peonage and indenture 
involved in personam rights—more precisely, defined rights 
enforceable against specific parties—and those kinds of rights have 
traditionally been associated with contract.76  For example, a contract 
between A and B might create a right for A to be paid one hundred 
dollars for B to receive specified goods.  These precisely defined 
rights against specified parties are typical in personam rights, which are 
normally associated with contracts.  If B owns property, she may have 
a right of quiet enjoyment, enforceable against any party.  That 
vaguely defined right, enforceable against an indeterminate number 
of parties, is a typical in rem right.77 
                                                          
 72. See  Wiecek, supra note 25, at 1715-25 (1996) (discussing indenture); see also 
Galenson, supra note 71, at 351 (noting that large numbers of white immigrants used 
indenture as a means of financing transatlantic passage, signing contracts to work for 
planters for a set number of years in exchange for those planters paying their fare). 
 73. See Aziz Z. Huq, Note, Peonage and Contractual Liberty, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 351, 
354-55 (2001) (examining the history and statutory authorization of peonage as a 
system of coerced labor).  Some commentators have even suggested that peonage 
was worse than chattel slavery.  See 1 I WAS BORN A SLAVE xxvii (Yuval Taylor ed., 
1999) (noting that peonage was “in some ways even worse” than slavery, since masters 
had no capital invested in peons and thus could mistreat them “without monetary 
loss”). 
 74. See Huq, supra note 73, at 379-84 (stating that federal courts defined peonage 
narrowly to require “indebtedness” resulting from a contractual agreement). 
 75. See HOHFELD, supra note 40, at 70-74 (describing in rem rights as enforceable 
against the world); see also Merrill & Smith, supra note 40, at 776-79 (noting that in 
rem rights are associated with property rights). 
 76. See HOHFELD, supra note 40, at 70-74 (describing in personam rights as those 
rights that either reside in or are available against a single person); see also Merrill & 
Smith, supra note 40, at 776-79 (noting that in personam rights are associated with 
contract rights). 
 77. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 40, at 776-79. 
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Indentured servants obligated themselves to serve a particular 
master for a specific length of time.78  The master’s rights, defined 
and controlled by the indenture and enforceable only by the master, 
were in personam.  While slavery granted some in personam rights to 
slave owners, unlike indenture, it had a significant in rem component.  
Specifically, slavery created numerous in rem rules—rights that the 
community possessed against slaves.  Depending on the jurisdiction, 
slaves were subject to legal prohibitions on owning property, making 
contracts, inheriting property, marrying, voting, or obtaining an 
education.79  Such restrictions were in rem because they could be 
enforced by the community, and not just by specific individual 
rightholders.80  Slavery’s reliance on in rem rights demonstrates that it 
was a property institution, unlike the contract-based indenture 
system.81 
Peonage is similarly distinct from slavery.  As one commentator 
notes, peonage “approximated slavery in substance, if not in legal 
form.”82  Peons, like indentured servants (and unlike slaves) were 
subject to specific contractual obligations to a certain employer, who 
was defined through a relationship of debt.83  The rights granted were 
in personam with respect to that employer, not in rem rights 
enforceable by other members of the community. 
                                                          
 78. See Galenson, supra note 71, at 352-54 (noting that indentured servants were 
bound to obey their master, who determined their work, living conditions, 
treatment, and punishment for a contractually specified length of time that usually 
ranged from four to ten or more years). 
 79. See, e.g., KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION:  SLAVERY IN THE 
ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 208 (1956) (recounting that slaves were not to be educated, even 
by their masters, but rather were to be manual laborers under the supervision of 
white men); Katherine Hunt Federle, Children, Curfews, and the Constitution, 73 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 1315, 1340-43 (discussing slave codes that “prohibited slaves from marrying, 
possessing firearms, learning to read and write, and suing their owners”); Wiecek, 
supra note 25, at 1767-68 (discussing New York laws that prohibited, inter alia, slaves 
from leaving the plantation without a pass). 
 80. One commentator refers to these restrictions on slave behavior as “public 
rights,” similar in nature to an exercise of the police power.  Thomas D. Russell, A 
New Image of the Slave Auction:  An Empirical Look at the Role of Law in Slave Sales and a 
Conceptual Reevaluation of Slave Property, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 473, 490-91 (1996).  
“Viewed conceptually, slave property was not just a relationship between one 
individual and a slave . . .  Instead, slave property was also the legal relationship 
among a number of non-slave individuals.”  Id. at 480. 
 81. This conclusion dovetails with the statement by Hohfeld, perhaps the 
premier scholar on the division between in rem and in personam rights, that the right 
to bodily integrity was an in rem property right.  See HOHFELD, supra note 40. 
In addition, indentures were traditionally given in exchange for consideration, 
while slavery was not.  See supra note 72 (noting that indentures were generally given 
in exchange for payment of the servant’s transportation to America).  But cf. 
Galenson, supra note 71 (noting that some indentures were imposed as part of a 
criminal sentence). 
 82. Huq, supra note 73, at 359. 
 83. Id. at 379-80. 
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Analysis of the laws of slavery also shows that they were derived 
from English common law of property. 84   The conclusion that slavery 
was a property institution is supported by the treatment of slaves as 
property in government transactions.  For example, slaves were 
auctioned in probate sales, which was standard treatment of a 
decedent’s property, not his contracts.85 
b. Self-purchase and voting 
Two thorny issues remain which might weigh against classification 
of slavery as a property institution:  the existence of self-purchase, 
which is allowing “property” to buy itself back; and the partial 
counting of slaves for representation purposes.  A small number of 
slave owners allowed some of their slaves to save money towards self-
purchase.  Slaves often earned this money by working for third 
parties on weekends.86 
Self-purchase is certainly unusual in a property regime.  However, 
the phenomenon may have simply been an attempt to ameliorate 
high supervision costs by giving slaves greater economic incentive to 
work.87  There are also suggestions that the device was used to control 
                                                          
 84. MORRIS, supra note 37, at 37-39, 104-07. 
 85. The auction of slaves showed that they were treated as property for the 
purposes of legal title, which, from a positivist perspective, effectively ends the 
question.  See infra notes 240-241 and accompanying text (discussing slave sales at 
probate auctions). 
 86. See John Cimprich, Self-Purchase, in DICTIONARY OF AFRO-AMERICAN SLAVERY, 
supra note 71, at 662 (stating that, while slaves technically worked solely for their 
master’s benefit, workdays ended at dusk and did not include Sundays, so industrious 
slaves could gain earnings from working overtime, performing odd jobs, and 
producing domestic and agricultural goods during their free time). 
 87. See BARZEL, supra note 18, at 108-09 (finding that because a forced slave is 
deprived of his or her entire net present value, owners faced a constant problem in 
productivity because of the incentive to underwork).  Barzel states that he does not 
mean to imply endorsement of the racist critique that slaves were naturally indolent, 
but rather, to suggest that slaves lacked the economic incentives that motivate other 
workers to perform at higher levels.  Id. at 107-11.  A paid laborer can gain extra 
wages for additional work, and thus has an incentive to work the number of hours 
that is most economically efficient.  However, slaves who are not allowed the 
opportunity to self-purchase gain nothing for additional work, and so their incentive 
is to work at the minimum required level.  Id. at 109.  See also Binder, supra note 34, 
at 2087-88 (discussing self-purchase for the owner’s economic benefit). 
This argument is probably incomplete.  For example, masters and overseers often 
punished slaves that they viewed as under-performing.  In fact, oftentimes slaves 
would overproduce to share their production with other slaves unable to meet 
production requirements.  However, it suggests one reason why self-purchase might 
have existed; namely, “[i]n pursuit of their own self-interest, owners permitted slaves 
to own and accumulate.”  BARZEL, supra note 18, at 110.  Barzel concludes that the 
attempt “to lower the cost of supervision then included granting slaves the right to 
part of the output or of their own time.  The slaves, though legally their masters’ 
property, were able to accumulate wealth and occasionally to buy their own 
contracts.”  Id. at 113. 
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and divide blacks.88  Regardless of the veracity of these assertions, the 
restrictions on self-purchase indicate that it was less than a full 
property right.  Slaves had extremely limited protection for their self-
purchase savings.89  Even slaves who were able to self-purchase did not 
have full access to the right of self-ownership.  While slave owners 
released property rights, the community did not; in rem rights were 
not changed.  In addition, even “freed” slaves were only free in 
limited jurisdictions and could be captured and enslaved in other 
jurisdictions.90  They were subject to onerous taxes designed to reduce 
the free Black population, and if unable to pay, they could be sold 
again into slavery.91  The limited scope of self-purchase is thus 
consistent with viewing slavery as a property institution. 
The counting of slaves for purposes of representation is also 
somewhat problematic.  Gouverneur Morris, a delegate at the 
Constitutional Convention, stated “Upon what principle is it that 
slaves shall be computed in the representation?  Are they men?  Then 
make them Citizens & let them vote.  Are they property?  Why then is 
no other property included?”92  This critique points out that the 
Southern states were willing to play fast and loose with the legal status 
of slaves, insisting on treating them as property except when they saw 
an advantage in doing otherwise.  The unusual treatment of slaves in 
the Three-Fifths Clause was the result of a political compromise.93  
                                                          
 88. See IRA BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS 149 (1974) (describing how 
slaveowners used the promise of freedom to motive slaves to work harder and to be 
more subservient); see also Binder, supra note 34, at 2089 (noting that, although many 
slaveowners disliked free Blacks, the ability to set slaves free was an important tool 
that slaveowners could use to their benefit). 
 89. See Jenny Bourne Wahl, Legal Constraints on Slave masters:  The Problem of Social 
Cost,41 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 13 n.4 (1997) (discussing restrictions on contracts for 
self-purchase); cf. Binder, supra note 34, at 2088 (finding that owners had some 
economic incentive not to renege, so that they could sell manumission to other 
slaves). 
 90. Cf. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 452-54 (1856) (finding that a slave does 
not become free when the owner moves to a free state). 
 91. See Kevin Outterson, Slave Taxes, in SHOULD AMERICA PAY?, supra note 4, at 
135, 141 (stating how early in the eighteenth century the taxation differed little 
between whites and slaves, but that immediately before the Revolution the use of 
special taxes on free Blacks for discriminatory purposes began and quickly grew). 
 92. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 222 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911).  A similar statement was made by delegate Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts.  
Arguing that “Blacks are property,” he demanded to know why Blacks’ 
representation should be increased because of the number of slaves.  See Paul 
Finkelman, Affirmative Action for the Master Class:  The Creation of the Proslavery 
Constitution, 32 AKRON L. REV. 423, 437 (1999) (discussing the process that lead to the 
acceptance of the Three-Fifths Clause). 
 93. See Finkelman, supra note 92, at 446-48 (noting that Northern legislators’ 
acceptance of the Three-Fifths Clause “was the beginning of a major compromise 
between the deep South and the commercially oriented states of the North”). 
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However, it does not change the fact that slaves were, as a general 
matter, treated as property.94 
In sum, the existence of self-ownership and the practice of 
counting slaves for representation are a bit unusual given slaves’ 
status as legal property; they do not change the categorization of 
slavery as a property system.95 
2. “Same government” requirement 
A second element required for takings compensation is that the 
taking be made by the government against whom the action is 
brought.96  This element is most easily shown for takings incident to 
slavery between 1808 and 1865.  For acts during that time period, 
there is an easily traceable line of authority connecting to modern 
federal and state governments.97   
A greater problem arises in that many slave laws were enacted by 
prior government entities.  The origin of slavery in the colonies can 
be traced to the seventeenth century, though the dates vary for 
different colonies.98  While many of the colonies were then 
                                                          
 94. Of course, the slaves themselves were not granted representation, but were 
simply used to calculate the representation of others; just as property requirements 
determined the electorate.  Property requirements for voting were a common part of 
the political system set up at the founding of the nation.  See, e.g., BELL, supra note 3, 
at 580-85 (discussing how property restrictions were used after the Civil War in order 
to limit the rights of Blacks); see also Sean Wilentz, Property and Power:  Suffrage Reform 
in the United States, 1787-1860, in VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY:  
ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF VOTING AND VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA 31-33 (Donald W. 
Rogers & Christine Scriabine eds., 1992) (demonstrating how property restrictions 
served a class-based function, giving more power to the propertied, theoretically to 
prevent the poor from confiscating their property).  For an example of a rejection of 
these ideas by modern courts see Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15.  395 U.S. 621, 
622 (1969) (overturning a property restriction statute that limited individuals who 
were eligible to vote in school district elections to property owners and parents, 
holding that such a property restriction violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 95. As one commentator notes, “when push came to shove, the slave as property 
clearly had priority over the slave as a person.”  Russell, supra note 80, at 488 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 96. This requirement derives from the language of the Takings Clause itself.  See 
U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Epstein, supra note 11, at 19-20. 
 97. As suggested below, the passage of time should not immunize these 
governments from takings liability.  See discussion infra Part IV.B.1 (addressing 
statutes of limitation issues). 
 98. Virginia imported its first slaves in 1619.  MORRIS, supra note 37, at 3-4.    
Between 1630 and 1660, Virginia courts began changing the sentences of Black 
indentured servants.  For crimes that would earn a whipping and additional years for 
white indentured servants, Black indentured servants had their indenture extended 
for life.  Paul Finkelman, Law, in DICTIONARY OF AFRO-AMERICAN SLAVERY, supra note 
71, at 394.  More restrictive laws were passed in the 1660s, and a statute was passed in 
1670 that provided that non-Christian African servants “shall be slaves for their lives,” 
while non-Christian Native American servants could gain their freedom after a 
discreet time period.  HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 18, at 37.  In 1680, Virginia formally 
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possessions of England, slavery in some states can be traced to settlers 
from other nations:  Spain in Florida; Holland in New York and New 
Jersey; and France in Louisiana and in the vast Louisiana Territory, 
which was later divided into numerous states.99 
This raises the question of whether the United States can be held 
responsible for acts performed before its inception.  An argument 
                                                          
passed a slave code that established extensive restrictions on Blacks and was later 
used as a model by other legislatures.  Id. at 39. 
Maryland converted Black indentured servants into slaves in 1639, and removed 
their right to be free as Christians in 1644.  Elbert B. Smith, Slavery in Maryland, in 
DICTIONARY OF AFRO-AMERICAN SLAVERY, supra note 71, at 440; see also Wiecek, supra 
note 25, at 1761 (arguing that the rights of Blacks declined gradually between 1634 
and 1664). 
North Carolina and South Carolina began as a single colony of Carolina.  Wiecek, 
supra note 25, at 1768; HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 18, at 153.  The colony’s 
proprietors issued the Fundamental Constitution of Carolina, authored by John 
Locke in 1669-1670; this document explicitly provided for slavery.  Wiecek, supra 
note 25, at 1768-70; HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 18, at 151-52; Jeffrey J. Crow, Slavery 
in North Carolina, in DICTIONARY OF AFRO-AMERICAN SLAVERY, supra note 71, at 537.  
North Carolina’s first slave code was enacted in 1715.  Id. at 539.  The South Carolina 
legislature first attempted to pass a slave law in 1690, but that law was struck down.  
HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 18, at 169.  The first comprehensive slave code was passed 
in 1712.  Id. 
Georgia was late to adopt slavery—it was even prohibited during its early history.  
HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 18, at 216-17; Wiecek, supra note 25, at 1771-73.  However, 
the prohibition was laxly enforced.  HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 18, at 227-37.  In any 
event, the prohibition of slavery proved economically unfeasible, and the legislature 
adopted a slave code in 1750.  Id. at 216-17; Wiecek, supra note 25, at 1772. 
In 1641, Massachusetts adopted legislation—the first such legislation—allowing for 
slavery.  Wiecek, supra note 25, at 1742-44.  Later legislation further strengthened the 
institution, although it was never particularly important in Massachusetts.  Id. at 
1744-46; see also HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 18, at 84 (noting the passage of laws 
equating Blacks with property).  Connecticut also began the use of slaves around this 
time.  Wiecek, supra note 25, at 1743-44. 
Rhode Island never adopted legislation allowing slavery, and in fact appears to 
have been legally bound by a 1652 proclamation of Providence and Warwick 
(predating the colony’s 1663 charter) banning slavery.  HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 
18, at 459 n.3; Wiecek, supra note 25, at 1746-47.  The ban was never enforced, and 
Rhode Island imported large numbers of slaves by the eighteenth century.  Id.     
New York began as a Dutch colony and was part of the slave trade by 1626.  
HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 18, at 101; Wiecek, supra note 25, at 1763-64.  English 
conquest changed legal rules, but maintained the institution of slavery.  Wiecek, 
supra note 25, at 1764-68.  In fact, the Duke of York, with a financial interest in the 
Royal African Company, actively encouraged the slave trade.  HIGGINBOTHAM, supra 
note 18, at 114.  New York adopted laws in 1665, a year after its annexation by the 
English, that recognized and extensively regulated slavery.  Id. at 115. 
Present-day New Jersey covers the area originally governed under more than one 
colonial government.  The Dutch portion originally followed the same law as New 
York.  Id. at 101.  While a Quaker portion resisted slavery for some time, the entire 
united colony adopted a slave code in 1713.  Wiecek, supra note 25, at 1771.   
Pennsylvania and Delaware were a single colony until 1701.  Slavery existed under 
the Duke of York’s laws prior to the division of the colonies.  HIGGINBOTHAM, supra 
note 18, at 270; see also id. at 267-99 (discussing slavery in the Pennsylvania and 
Delaware area).  After the colonies were divided, slave codes were established in 
Delaware in 1721 and Pennsylvania in 1725.  Wiecek, supra note 25, at 1771. 
 99. See Wiecek, supra note 25, at 1773-90. 
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could be made that any debt to slaves for the confiscation of their 
self-ownership would adhere to the original European powers that 
controlled the colonies at the time laws allowing slavery were passed.  
The stronger argument, however, is that the United States assumed 
those obligations when the colonies won their independence.  Great 
Britain, upon signing the Treaty of Paris with United States, released 
all of “propriety and territorial rights” of the United States.100  As 
Chief Justice Marshall noted, “[b]y this treaty, the powers of 
government, and the right to soil, which had previously been in Great 
Britain, passed definitively to these States.”101  The United States was 
treated as a successor state to the colonies, not unlike a corporate 
successor, and inherited both assets and liabilities.102 
Even though the United States may be deemed to have succeeded 
to the colonies’ liabilities, potential federalism problems exist that 
could arguably prevent the federal government from being held 
liable.  The federal government did not enact the laws creating 
slavery.  Rather, they were enacted by a number of state governments 
and their precursors.103  The Takings Clause, like other portions of 
the Bill of Rights, originally applied only to the federal government.104   
                                                          
 100. Definitive Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and His 
Britannic Majesty, Sept. 3, 1783, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. I, 8 Stat. 80, 81. 
 101. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 584 (1823). 
 102. Cf. Paul R. Williams, The Treaty Obligations of the Successor States of the Former 
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia:  Do They Continue in Force?, 23 DENV. J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 11-17 (1994) (discussing the legal effect of numerous state 
secessions and separations outside the United States); see also Brief of Amici Curiae of 
the States of Montana et al., in Support of Petitioners, Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 
(2001) (No. 99-1994) (discussing which attributes of sovereignty were passed from 
Britain to the United States at independence).  Presumably, the same would apply to 
colonies, which were inherited from France, Holland, and Spain, due to treaties with 
those countries.  This obligation would apply only to slave laws in the area that later 
became the United States.  For example, if a person was enslaved in a French colony 
in Africa, and subsequently transported to a French colony in Louisiana, the United 
States would be responsible for the enslaving act in Louisiana, not the one in Africa.  
The original enslavement in Africa is not “binding.”  Because the slave’s self-
ownership is inalienable, he is continuously re-enslaved by the laws allowing slavery, 
and since this re-enslavement is never valid, it is always repeated again the next day. 
The case for successor liability is especially strong where, as in this case, the 
liabilities spring from actions that have contributed to the creation of the inherited 
assets.  Laws allowing slavery enhanced the colonial economies, through commerce, 
agriculture, and taxation, as set out, supra notes 231-245. 
 103. See supra note 98 (chronicling the passage of laws allowing slavery in different 
colonies). 
 104. The Bill of Rights was gradually incorporated against the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 215-30 (1998); FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 65 (stating that, for most 
of the 1800s, federal courts applied the Bill of Rights against the federal government 
and not the states).  “If citizens wanted to prevent state legislative infringements on 
property, they had to word their own constitutions accordingly.”  Id.  Interestingly, 
the Takings Clause was the first part of the Bill of Rights to be incorporated.  Id. at 
66.  
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The partial overlap between state and federal takings clauses 
mitigates the federalism problem.105  Many states had individual 
takings clauses, under which they might be liable for compensation.106  
In addition, the federal government participated in slavery by 
protecting the slave trade and enforcing claims on slave ownership 
between states.107  Slavery in the District of Columbia was directly 
subject to federal regulations.108  Federal laws were indispensable in 
effectuating the taking; the federal government’s exercise of its 
commerce power allowed the states to continue the taking of slaves’ 
self-ownership property rights.  Slavery was dependent on a system of 
contracts that were enforced through the Contracts Clause of the 
Constitution.109  Thus, the federal government’s participation in 
slavery makes it liable for compensation.   
B. Existence of a Taking:  The Types of Takings Involved 
Section A concluded that slavery was a system of property and that 
the current government of the United States is implicitly responsible 
for such system.  Takings jurisprudence recognizes the categories of 
physical takings and regulatory takings.  This Section examines how 
slavery fits within those categories, and how it might fit within other 
theoretical categories.   
1. Physical takings 
Physical takings involve the appropriation of title to property or the 
confiscation of one or more of the “sticks” from the “bundle of sticks” 
that comprise the property owner’s interest.110  For example, 
government imposition of an easement or a right of passage will 
trigger the Takings Clause.111  Although title may remain with the 
owner, the government has removed valuable sticks from the 
bundle.112 
                                                          
 105. See id. at 65-66. 
 106. See Fischel, supra note 11, at 65-66. 
 107. Paul Finkelman, Essay, The Founders and Slavery: Little Ventured, Little Gained, 
13 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 413, 437-44 (2001) (discussing federal involvement in slavery). 
 108. See Henry S. Robinson, Slavery in the District of Columbia, in DICTIONARY OF 
AFRO-AMERICAN SLAVERY, supra note 71, at 192-93. 
 109. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing 
the Obligation of Contracts”); see Alfred Brophy, Note, Let Us Go Back and Stand Upon 
the Constitution:  Federal-State Relations in Scott v. Sandford, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 192, 221 
(1990) (stating that the Contracts Clause might be used to maintain slavery once it 
had been established in a territory, even if the territory later became a free state). 
 110. See, e.g., United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002) (describing the 
common idiom “bundle of sticks” as a collection of individual rights which, in certain 
combinations, constitute property). 
 111. Id. at 296 n.5. 
 112. Id.  But cf. Merrill, supra note 63, at 906 (noting that dividing a bundle of 
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It is unlikely that actual title to a slave’s property right of self-
ownership was transferred to the government, especially given the 
inalienable nature of that property right.  What is certain is that 
nearly all of the sticks from the bundle—for example, liberty, family 
integrity, and enjoyment of labor—were confiscated.  That 
confiscation resulted in a physical taking, that is, removal of effective 
title to property. 
2. Regulatory takings 
Slavery also fits easily within the regulatory takings framework.  The 
regulatory takings doctrine allows compensation for regulations that 
deprive an owner of a substantial amount of property value.113  These 
types of takings were first recognized in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon,114 in which Justice Holmes stated, “if regulation goes too far it 
will be recognized as a taking.”115  The idea has remained largely 
unchanged since its inception.  One commentator recently 
summarized the doctrine; “there are some regulatory schemes so 
close in spirit to eminent domain that they must be regarded as 
takings.”116  The Supreme Court has eschewed any categorical rule in 
the area, instead finding that the test for a regulation which “goes too 
far” is to be factual and ad hoc.117 
A requisite for all compensable regulatory takings is a regulation 
that affects property interests.118  In the case of slavery, the 
requirement of a regulation is met.  The origin of slavery in the 
colonies began with legislation passed mostly in the seventeenth 
century.119  The adoption of slavery was an affirmative step taken by 
the colonies since slavery was virtually non-existent in England.120  
                                                          
property rights into several “discreet assets” could limit the viability of further 
“conceptual severance” of the rights associated with those assets). 
 113. See generally FISCHEL, supra note 11 (exploring regulatory takings from both an 
economic and a legal point of view). 
 114. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 115. Id. at 415. 
 116. FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 59. 
 117. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302, 326 (2002) (concluding that the courts should resist the temptation to adopt per 
se rules in cases involving partial regulatory takings, choosing instead to examine a 
number of factors rather than a simple mathematically precise formula). 
 118. See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (proclaiming that an 
ordinance affecting a property interest is a taking if it “does not substantially advance 
legitimate state interests”). 
 119. See supra note 98. 
 120. See Wiecek, supra note 25, at 1715-25 (discussing the lack of slavery in English 
tradition); see also DAVID LYONS, UNFINISHED BUSINESS:  RACIAL JUNCTURES IN U.S. 
HISTORY AND THEIR LEGACY 6 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 02-06, 2002) (stating that the legal institution of chattel slavery 
did not exist through most of the seventeenth century, but was constructed during 
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The colonies passed statutes that created slavery as an institution and 
allowed for the children of female slaves to be born into slave 
status.121  This move was a conscious decision by political leaders who 
understood the alternatives and sought to benefit from slavery.122 
After slavery was adopted, governments became actively involved in 
its regulation, taxation, and execution.  Government actors 
conducted a large percentage of slave auctions, allowing neutral 
devices such as probate and the seizure of debtors’ assets to become 
part of the slave trade.123  State governments passed regulations 
facilitating the recapture of escaped slaves.124  There is even a Fugitive 
Slave Clause enshrined in the Constitution.125  Along with the laws 
originally establishing slavery, fugitive slave laws and slave trade 
regulations show a pattern of regulation linked to the taking of slaves’ 
self-ownership.126  The express language of the Fugitive Slave Clause—
that slaves from each state were held “under the Laws thereof”—
                                                          
the later decades of the seventeenth century by those who ruled the colony of 
Virginia), available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/papers/ 
pdf_files/LyonsD061702.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 121. See supra note 98 (discussing the adoption of laws allowing slavery in the 
colonies). 
 122. Colonial leaders sought to achieve political benefits by racializing slavery; by 
forcing slaves to the bottom of the color-coded social system, they accorded greater 
privilege and opportunity to those on the second tier.  See LYONS, supra note 120, at 
15. 
 123. See infra notes 231-245 and accompanying text (discussing government 
involvement in and benefits from the slave market). 
 124. See MORRIS, supra note 37, at 340-46 (discussing fugitive slave laws). 
 125. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (“No person held to Service or Labour in one 
State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any 
Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be 
delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due”). 
 126. In addition to analyzing regulations that established slavery, and confiscated 
slaves’ self-ownership, under a standard regulatory takings analysis it is also possible 
to characterize them as laws creating easements.  This easement did not destroy the 
property interest of the slaves (their bodies) because to do so would be 
counterproductive; rather, it granted to others (owners) the right to use that 
property interest.  Forced easements are compensable under the Takings Clause.  
See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982) 
(authorizing compensation in a case involving a television cable easement); Griggs v. 
Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 89-90 (1962) (finding that homeowners were owed 
just compensation as a result of an over-flight easement); United States v. Causby, 
328 U.S. 256, 262-63 (1946) (compensating landowners for damages to property 
resulting from an over-flight easement).  See generally FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 57-59 
(noting cases whereby easements as takings called for appropriate compensation). 
Alternatively, slavery could be considered a system of zoning.  Slaves’ self-
ownership was improperly “zoned” to be takeable by others.  Zoning regulations that 
are overly intrusive are also compensable.  See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003, 1011-12 (1992) (holding that some deprivations of use are compensable under 
the Takings Clause). 
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underscores that slavery was a creature of law and regulation, 
imposed over a baseline of freedom for all persons.127 
The regulatory framework established by governments to facilitate 
slavery meets the requirement of regulatory action by the 
government.  This regulation is also one that “goes too far” under the 
tests proposed by Mahon128 and Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New 
York City.129  The regulation destroys all value that the original 
property holder had in the property, rendering self-ownership 
worthless by transferring ownership rights to other parties.  The 
severity of the regulation is tantamount to “obliteration of value” of 
the property and removes “all economically beneficial uses” for it.130  
Slavery thus meets the definition of a regulatory taking. 
3. Alternative takings theories:  Derivative takings and givings 
In addition to the comparatively well-settled areas of physical 
takings and regulatory takings, scholars have argued for the 
compensation other types of takings, such as derivative takings and 
givings. 
The idea behind derivative takings is that an original taking, while 
compensable to the owner of that property, may cause additional 
harm to third parties.131  A derivative taking results from either a 
physical taking or a regulatory taking and occurs when the original 
taking reduces the value of surrounding property.132  Several scholars 
argue that such consequential damages should be compensable 
under the Takings Clause, that their exclusion from the losses 
awarded in takings cases is not defensible, and that their inclusion 
would force the state to consider and to bear the full costs of its 
                                                          
 127. See Binder, supra note 34, at 2077-78 (“Anglo-American jurisprudence . . . 
assumed that slavery violated natural law and could only be established by positive 
law.”). 
 128. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922) (describing the 
contours of the regulatory taking doctrine and restating the general rule that while 
property may be regulated by the government, regulations that go “too far” will be 
deemed a compensable taking). 
 129. See 438 U.S. 104, 123-28 (1978) (noting the factors that guide a 
determination of whether a particular regulation constitutes a taking to include the 
economic impact of the regulation and the character of the government action). 
 130. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1010, 1019 (holding that where a state seeks to sustain a 
regulation that deprives land of “all economically beneficial use,” it may resist 
compensation only if the inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate showed that 
the proscribed use was not part of the owner’s title to begin with). 
 131. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 15, at 280 (observing that, although the 
government compensates owners of property subject to the original taking, equally-
harmed owners of surrounding property are not compensated for their diminished 
property values). 
 132. Id. at 280-81. 
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actions.133  Consequently, a state would be encouraged to use its 
eminent domain power only when such use will enhance social 
utility.134  Proponents further argue that a policy of not compensating 
derivative takings cannot be justified on either efficiency grounds or 
fairness grounds.135  Courts, however, have consistently rejected 
derivative takings claims.136 
In the case of slavery, the derivative harm is plain—slavery has led 
to institutionalized racism in society, a continuing harm to slave 
descendants.137  The comparative disadvantages of racial minorities, 
including Blacks, are well documented.  According to recent census 
figures, 22% of Blacks lived in poverty in 2000, compared with 9.4% 
of whites.138  Disadvantages also appear in education statistics, where 
                                                          
 133. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 52 (arguing that the Takings Clause was 
meant to protect the owner of the item taken, not the item itself, and as such 
consequential damages should be recoverable). 
 134. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 15, at 282-83 (suggesting a takings 
compensation program that would promote truthful takings claims against the 
government, prevent overpayment by the government for its takings, and, as such, 
result in an economically efficient takings regime). 
 135. See id. at 290-93 (stating that without a policy of compensation, the 
government may act inefficiently by failing to consider total net costs, or unfairly by 
failing to consider whether the costs of its actions disproportionately burden certain 
members of the public).  But see Treanor, supra note 11, at 859 (commenting that 
under the original understanding of the Takings Clause, the government did not 
owe compensation for property not physically taken, no matter how severely its 
actions affected the value of the property). 
 136. See EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 52 (noting that courts uniformly deny 
consequential damages in eminent domain cases on the theory that the government 
did not take the consequentially lost items).  The most well-known case is United 
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), in which the Supreme Court awarded damages 
to homeowners whose property lay directly below the air routes of military jets, but 
not to other property owners who suffered nearly identical damage but were not 
directly overflown by the government planes.  Id. at 260-62. 
 137. See KEITH N. HYLTON, SLAVERY AND TORT LAW 30 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law 
Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 03-02, 2003) (arguing that slavery led to 
racism by giving racist beliefs an economic component), available at 
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/papers/pdf_files/HyltonK012803.pdf (on file with 
the American University Law Review); see also LYONS, supra note 120, at 41-43 
(suggesting that the social programs enacted in the 1900s failed to correct the legacy 
of inequalities resulting from 350 years of slavery and Jim Crow laws).  This harm also 
stems in part from the politically-motivated failure to meet the promises of 
Reconstruction.  See id. at 26-30 (stating that the Hayes-Tilden Agreement of 1877, 
which handed the presidential election to the Republicans in exchange for an end to 
the federal government’s oversight of freed Black’s rights, ended Reconstruction and 
led to the exclusion of Blacks from political participation). 
Note that racism also affects other minority groups.  The question of whether 
other minority groups could seek Takings Clause compensation, based on the taking 
of slaves’ self-ownership or on other takings, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 138. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL POVERTY TABLES, TABLE 5:  PERCENT 
OF PEOPLE IN POVERTY, BY DEFINITION OF INCOME AND SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS:  2000, 
at http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/poverty00/table5.html (last visited Oct. 2, 
2003) (on file with the American University Law Review). 
The table contains different figures for different definitions of poverty.  Other 
definitions vary somewhat in the numbers they produce, but consistently place Blacks 
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74.9% of adult Blacks have a high-school diploma or more, compared 
with 86.2% of whites; 13.3% have a college bachelor’s degree or 
more, compared with 26.2% of whites.139  Black per capita income in 
1998 was just above half of white per capita income, a ratio that has 
remained largely unchanged for at least thirty years.140  Black median 
family income in 1998 was $29,404; white median family income was 
$49,023.141  The number of Blacks below the poverty level has 
decreased during the past three decades as a percentage of the Black 
population, from 33.5% in 1970 to 23.6% in 1998, while the number 
of whites below the poverty level held fast at about 10% throughout 
that time.142  Black males had an incarceration rate in 1999 eight 
times higher than white males.143  Department of Justice statistics 
show that in 1997 Blacks as a whole had a 16.2% chance of going to 
prison in their lifetime, compared with a 2.5% chance for whites.144  
Among homicide defendants, the chances that a Black defendant will 
be charged with a capital crime and receive the death penalty 
continue to rise.145  According to Department of Justice figures from 
                                                          
at a significantly higher level of poverty than whites.  For example, when poverty is 
defined as income less taxes plus capital gains or losses without EIC, 10.5% of whites 
are under the poverty level, compared to 24.0% of Blacks.  Id.  Similarly, when 
poverty is defined as income less taxes plus capital gains or losses with EIC, 9.1% of 
whites are below the poverty level, compared to 21.1% of Blacks.  Id.  See also 
Complaint and Jury Trial Demand ¶ 18, Farmer-Paellmann v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., 
No. CV-02-1862 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002) (citing a census report showing that in 1998 
in the United States, 26% of Blacks lived in poverty compared to 8% of whites), 
available at http://www.nyed.uscourts.gov/02cv1862cmp.pdf (on file with the 
American University Law Review); CHUCK COLLINS & FELICE YESKEL, ECONOMIC 
APARTHEID IN AMERICA:  A PRIMER ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND INSECURITY 43-46 
(2000) (demonstrating that income inequality has widened more drastically among 
Blacks than among whites). 
 139. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, TABLE 7:  EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF PERSONS 
25 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY SEX, REGION, AND RACE:  MARCH 1997, at 
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/race/black/tabs97/tab07.txt (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review).  The Farmer-
Paellmann suit lists slightly different figures for 1998, finding that 14.7% of African 
Americans had four-year college degrees, compared with 25% of whites.  Complaint 
and Jury Trial Demand ¶ 18, Farmer-Paellmann (No. CV-02-1862). 
 140. See THE NEW YORK TIMES 2001 ALMANAC 319 (John W. Wright ed., 2001) 
(listing Black per capita income in 1998 as $12,957, and white per capita income in 
1998 as $21,394). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. (containing percentages for whites below the poverty line ranging 
between 9.8% and 11.4% for the years between 1970 and 1999). 
 143. See id. at 310 (noting incarceration rates, in prisoners per 100,000 resident 
population, of 3,408 for Black males and 417 for white males). 
 144. Id. at 312.  The statistics for males are more dramatic—Black males have a 
28.5% chance of going to prison, while white males have a 4.4% chance.  Id. 
 145. See Bernard A. Williams, Guilty Until Proven Innocent:  The Tragedy of Habeas 
Capital Appeals, 18 J.L. & POL. 773, 779, 782 (2002) (summarizing evidence that the 
death penalty is disproportionately applied to Blacks and finding that states with 
larger Black populations are under more political pressure to seek the death 
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2000, Black women were fifteen percent more likely than white 
women to be victims of crimes of violence other than murder; Black 
men were thirty-six percent more likely than white men.146 
As one lawsuit succinctly sums up the gloomy picture, Blacks “lag 
behind whites according to every social yardstick:  literacy, life 
expectancy, income, and education.”147  These disparities can be 
linked to the legacy of slavery.148  Since the time of slavery, society has 
reinforced a presumption that Blacks are inferior, unintelligent, or 
criminal.149   They are a modern manifestation of an invidious right 
created by society through slavery, the right of “white privilege.”150  As 
                                                          
penalty).  Of the people on death row today, forty-three percent are Black and over 
one-half are people of color.  Id. at 779 n.33. 
 146. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 
2000 STATISTICAL TABLES, Table 6 (2002) (finding rates for crimes of violence, per 
1,000 persons age 12 and over, to be 28.5% for Black women, 22.7% for white 
women, 43.4% for Black men, and 31.8% for white men), at http://www.ojp. 
usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cvus0001.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2003) (on file with the 
American University Law Review); see also LISA D. BASTAIN & BRUCE M. TAYLOR, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, YOUNG BLACK MALE VICTIMS (1994) (finding that young 
Black males have approximately a 150% greater chance of being a victim of violent 
crime than young white males), available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ 
pdf/ygbkml.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 147. Complaint and Jury Trial Demand ¶ 19, Farmer-Paellmann (No. CV-02-1862). 
 148. See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 74 (stating that slavery and its aftereffects, 
including the disparate position in which newly freed slaves found themselves in the 
years following slavery, made it unrealistic that future generations of Blacks and 
whites would find themselves on equal footing); JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE 
PROBLEM:  HOW OUR CULTURE HAS WEAKENED FAMILIES 126-29 (2002) (suggesting that 
problems in and expectations among the African American family unit can be 
attributed to slavery); Van Dyke, supra note 20, at 61-62 (discussing some of the 
continuing effects of slavery); see also WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE BRIDGE OVER THE 
RACIAL DIVIDE:  RISING INEQUALITY AND COALITION POLITICS 12-23, 33-39 (1999) 
(analyzing the role of race and racism in economic inequality); Chisolm, supra note 
5, at 687-89 (indicating that statistical inequalities between Blacks and whites relate 
to past patterns of discrimination). 
 149. Paul Finkelman, The Crime of Color, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2063, 2063-70 (1993) 
(discussing how slavery led to societal associations of crime with Blacks). 
 150. See PEGGY MCINTOSH, WHITE PRIVILEGE AND MALE PRIVILEGE:  A PERSONAL 
ACCOUNT OF COMING TO SEE CORRESPONDENCES THROUGH WORK IN WOMEN’S STUDIES 
10-11 (Wellesley Coll. Ctr. for Research on Women, Working Paper No. 189, 1988) 
(describing white privilege as “conditions of daily experience” which afford 
advantages to whites); Robert Jensen, White Privilege Shapes the United States, BALT. SUN, 
July 19, 1998 at 1C (acknowledging the existence of white privilege as an unearned 
privilege experienced by all white people to varying extents); see also Jerome 
McCristal Culp, Jr., To the Bone:  Race and White Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1637, 1659-
60, 1664 (1999) (discussing white privilege and the influential effect of white 
perspectives on the law and legal academia). 
The existence of white privilege serves as a justification for reparations even in 
cases of later immigrants or other non-slaveowners.  See Molly Secours, Riding the 
Reparations Bandwagon, in SHOULD AMERICA PAY?, supra note 4, at 286, 287-88 (finding 
that benefits of white privilege are conferred on all white individuals, regardless of 
whether or not their families previously owned slaves); Van Dyke, supra note 20, at 
72-73 (stating that white people, in general, incur substantial benefits from the 
existence of white privilege). 
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such, these disparities are derivative harms stemming from the 
original taking.  If one believes that it is proper to compensate 
derivative takings, then slavery looks compensable.151 
A related argument based on derivative harms is that although 
original takings victims are no longer alive, their heirs may pursue the 
original victims’ claims because the government deprived the original 
victims of the right to bring the claim.  The heirs may appropriately 
bring such claims because the original taking affects their own social 
and educational opportunities.152  Although the passage of time and 
the imperfect connections between slaves and their heirs, or in some 
cases the lack of any connection to slave ancestors, somewhat weaken 
the argument that modern Blacks are the appropriate heirs of slaves, 
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule argue that this connection 
problem should be overlooked because, “the stigma of slavery 
attaches only to people who are perceived to be black and not to 
nonblacks.”153  This stigma of inferiority is related to societal racism, 
which in turn is linked to slavery.154  Under this argument, modern 
Blacks are the appropriate heirs of slaves and, even if some are not 
direct heirs, they are the derivatively-harmed party for takings 
analysis. 
A similar argument can be made using givings analysis.  Givings 
theory argues that where government action unfairly rewards one 
party, that party should be required to reimburse the government.155  
Although no courts have adopted this model, it has strong intuitive 
appeal:  arbitrary or capricious givings to one party are similar to the 
arbitrary and capricious takings, which led to the adoption of the 
Takings Clause. 
Since whites enjoy greater income, educational opportunities, and 
employment opportunities than Blacks,156 a givings analysis applied to 
slavery would hold that the advantages of non-Africans evidence a 
                                                          
 151. But see Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1108-10 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting 
plaintiff’s claim in reparations context where plaintiff sought damages for the 
continued discrimination stemming from the enslavement of African Americans). 
 152. See supra notes 146-148 and accompanying text (discussing some of the 
continuing effects of slavery, including economic inequalities and the disparities 
associated with white privilege). 
 153. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical 
Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 708 (2003). 
 154. Finkelman, supra note 149, at 2063-70. 
 155. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 11, at 574-80 (stating that a giving occurs 
when the government bestows a benefit upon someone, such as a change in zoning 
laws that increases property values, but when such a benefit is inequitably given, the 
government should assess charges against the recipient). 
 156. See supra notes 134-147 and accompanying text (discussing statistics regarding 
income, educational, incarceration, and employment disparities). 
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“giving” to non-slaves and their descendants.  This giving is still 
occurring, and under givings analysis, should be taxed.  A tax on a 
giving could have largely the same effect as remuneration for a 
taking.157 
Of course, arguments involving derivative takings or givings are 
risky, primarily because courts have not yet approved these 
arguments.  However, despite their lack of a strong legal foundation 
at present, these arguments are nevertheless valuable.  First, slavery 
may prove a sufficiently compelling example for courts to accept 
these theories as a basis for compensation.  Second, by making these 
arguments, reparations advocates can gain valuable allies by bringing 
takings scholars into the reparations fold.  Finally, such arguments 
provide broader appeal for courts—traditional tort-based reparations 
arguments can appeal to liberal judges, while takings-based 
arguments may appeal to conservative judges. 
III. SLAVERY IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 
This Part examines whether the Constitution endorses slavery and 
how any constitutional endorsement might affect slaves’ takings 
claims, viewed in light of the purpose of the Takings Clause.  Section 
A discusses the purpose of the Takings Clause.  Section B addresses 
constitutional text and history that could represent an endorsement 
of slavery.  Section C analyzes how to avoid the negative results of any 
constitutional endorsement. 
A. Purpose of the Takings Clause 
This Section briefly analyzes three of the leading theories that 
describe the purpose of the Takings Clause.  Each theory is evaluated 
to determine whether compensation for slavery is consistent with that 
theory.  It finds each theory consistent with takings compensation for 
slavery. 
1. Libertarianism:  Richard Epstein 
Richard Epstein, perhaps the most prominent expositor of the 
Takings Clause, has argued that many government acts—including 
most taxes—ought to be compensable under the Takings Clause.158  
                                                          
 157. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 11, at 591-93, 597-600 (commenting on 
the appropriateness of a givings tax where the opposite action would result in a 
compensable taking and analyzing the means for computing and levying such taxes). 
 158. See EPSTEIN, supra note 11, passim.  This relatively hands-off approach is often 
characterized as libertarian.  See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Marion Schwartzchild, The 
Uncertain Relationship Between Libertarianism and Utilitarianism, 19 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 
657, 657-59 (2000). 
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Epstein argues that the clause exists “to guarantee a proportionate 
distribution of the gain among all of the parties from whom the 
government takes private property.”159  Like a private actor, the 
government must be held accountable for harms it inflicts on parties 
for its own good—where private parties are subject to tort law, the 
government is subject to takings limitations.160  Noting that property 
can be viewed as a bundle of rights, Epstein argues that “partial 
takings” of any of that bundle ought to be compensated.161  Epstein 
also contends that, “[t]he greater the numbers [of takings victims], 
the greater the wrong.”162   
Using Epstein’s approach, the taking of slaves’ self-ownership looks 
like a compensable taking.  If the Takings Clause is designed to 
equitably distribute the gain from society’s decisions to confiscate 
property, then slaves should receive their portion of the gain from 
the confiscation of their self-ownership; that is, compensation to 
offset the harm they have suffered and to bring them in line with the 
rest of the populace.  Epstein’s arguments for compensation for a 
partial taking of any of the bundle of property rights also weigh in 
slaves’ favor—slaves certainly suffered at least a partial taking when 
their property right to quiet enjoyment was confiscated.  His belief 
that the greater the scope of the takings, the greater the wrong, also 
suggests that slavery, and its mass confiscation of self-ownership, 
ought to be compensable. 163 
2. Historical analysis:  William Treanor 
William Treanor argues that James Madison, who bears most of the 
responsibility for the Takings Clause,164 deliberately chose not to 
protect non-physical property.165  Madison intentionally limited the 
                                                          
 159. EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 15. 
 160. See id. at 36-39 (discussing the need for compensation by analogy to private 
law). 
 161. See id. at 60-62 (arguing that the “partial loss of single incidents may 
determine the measure of damages but may not negate the taking”). 
 162. Id. at 94. 
 163. Epstein’s other writings suggest a belief that slavery was a confiscation of self-
ownership.  He writes that “slavery is the antithesis of the system of self-ownership on 
which any sensible property right rests.  Its abolition should be regarded as a 
restoration of property rights.”  Richard A. Epstein, The Seven Deadly Sins of Takings 
Law: Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 26 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 955, 977 
(1993).  However, Epstein has written that Indian and slave claims may be blocked 
due to statutes of limitation.  EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 346-50.  As this Article argues, 
that analysis does not apply to slavery since statutes of limitation should not apply to 
this taking.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 164. See Treanor, supra note 11, at 849-55 (commenting on Madison’s support of 
the principles that appear in the Takings Clause such as concern for protection of 
land property from majoritarian rule). 
 165. See generally id. at 836-55 (discussing Madison’s views of the Takings Clause 
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clause’s scope because he believed that the legislature was best 
equipped to deal with regulatory intrusions and that the Constitution 
adequately protected against such intrusions.166  Constitutional 
protection was required only for certain physical takings, including 
the takings of land from property holders or of slaves from slave 
owners.167  This was primarily because physical property takings were 
especially vulnerable to failures of the political process.168  Treanor 
suggests that in today’s society, compensation should also be given for 
environmental takings aimed at discreet and insular minorities.169 
Application of Treanor’s tests to slavery results in a mixed bag.  
The taking of slaves’ self-ownership rights was neither an 
appropriation of physical property, nor one of Treanor’s narrowly 
defined exceptions for regulatory takings.  Treanor’s belief that 
slaveowners’ rights were protected could suggest non-acceptance of 
compensation for slaves.  On the other hand, slaves’ control over 
their bodies—one of the “bundle of sticks” constituting physical 
property ownership—was taken.  As argued above, slaveowners’ 
control of slaves constituted a physical taking,170 thereby satisfying 
Treanor’s test.  In addition, because the political process certainly did 
not adequately consider slaves’ property claims of self-ownership 
fairly, slaves’ claims seem to fall under one of Treanor’s tests, namely 
                                                          
and suggesting that constitutional protections for property rights was initially limited 
to takings of physical property in order to protect against majoritarian confiscation 
of land and slaves). 
 166. See id. at 841-42 (recognizing Madison’s belief that the checks and balances 
system could sufficiently protect property interests); see also Gary Lawson & Guy 
Seidman, Taking Notes:  Subpoenas and Just Compensation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1081, 1087 
(1999) (stating that prior to the ratification of the Takings Clause as part of the Fifth 
Amendment, the Constitution already reflected the principles underlying the 
Takings Clause; namely, compensation for government appropriations of property). 
 167. See Treanor, supra note 11, at 849-54 (detailing Madison’s belief that the 
potential for population expansion and future majoritarian decisionmaking meant 
that ownership of land and slaves required additional protection). 
 168. Id. at 854; see id. at 827-34, 836 (discussing the adoption of state takings 
clauses prior to the adoption of the Constitution, and concluding that their adoption 
resulted from specific process failures involving land held by politically vulnerable 
groups).  The background understanding of the Takings Clause, coupled with the 
Framers’ and ratifiers’ intents, indicate that the Takings Clause was designed to 
require compensation where political process failures threatened to consider 
property claims, and their attendant consequences on the economic well-being of 
the property owners, unfairly.  Id. at 854-55. 
 169. See id. at 873-77 (describing environmental racism as the likelihood that 
minority communities will receive a disproportionately high number of hazardous 
waste sites due to such communities’ lack of political advantage, therefore justifying 
the application of the Takings Clause to such environmental justice cases). 
 170. See supra notes 110-112 and accompanying text (recognizing that property 
consists of a collection of individual rights, a concept that supports the argument 
that slaves suffered a physical taking). 
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that majoritarian decisionmakers have not evidenced a history of fair 
consideration of property claims.171 
3. Economic and philosophical approach:  Frank Michelman 
Frank Michelman argues that the Takings Clause offers a way to 
turn Kaldor-Hicks transactions—those that increase total societal 
wealth but decrease the wealth of particular parties—into Pareto 
superior transactions—those that benefit all parties.172  Michelman 
argues that takings can be evaluated under either a fairness or a 
utility analysis.  Both Michelman’s utility analysis and his fairness 
analysis support arguments favoring compensation for slavery.173 
a. Michelman’s utilitarian analysis 
Under a utilitarian analysis, compensation is appropriate where the 
“demoralization cost” of an action—the negative effect on total utility 
that occurs if the action invades property rights and upsets 
investment and property expectations—is greater than the cost of 
compensation.174  According to Michelman, it is appropriate to 
compensate the victims of the takings because the “risk of 
majoritarian exploitation” creates greater disincentives for parties to 
contribute to society than do naturally occurring risks, such as 
earthquakes and plague.175  Even larger demoralization costs may be 
suitable under circumstances where “capricious” majoritarian 
behavior is involved;176 where societal actions cause disproportionate 
burdens to fall on particular parties;177 and where actions tend to 
channel benefits and burdens to different groups of people.178 
Slavery satisfies many, if not all, of these criteria.  Slavery, because it 
involves the designation of members of a minority race for 
confiscation of their property right of self-ownership, appears to be a 
                                                          
 171. See Treanor, supra note 11. 
 172. Michelman, supra note 11, at 1176-78 (discussing the economics of 
efficiency).  See generally RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 14-17 (5th ed. 
1998) (explaining the relationship between Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency). 
 173. Michelman notes that fairness analysis and utilitarian analysis often, though 
not always, reach the same result.  Michelman, supra note 11, at 1223-24. 
 174. See id. at 1215 (noting the emergence of a rule making compensation 
mandatory in situations in which demoralization costs and efficiency gains exceed 
settlement costs). 
 175. Id. at 1216-17. 
 176. Id. at 1217 (“Capricious distributions will not be tolerated, even as accidental 
adjuncts of efficiency-dictated measure, when compensation settlements can be 
reached without much trouble . . . .”). 
 177. Id. at 1217 (“The clearer it is that the claimant has sustained an injury distinct 
from those sustained by the generality of persons in society . . . the more compelling 
will his claim to compensation become.”). 
 178. Id. at 1218. 
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“majoritarian exploitation” of a powerless minority group.  The use of 
race as a classification could be considered capricious.179  The 
confiscation of self-ownership involved in slavery caused a 
disproportionate burden, both in absolute and in relative terms, to 
fall on a few select parties.  Those parties lost all, or nearly all, of their 
self-ownership, which was an unusually important property interest 
for them.  Finally, the taking of slavery channeled benefits to one 
group of people—landowners, slave owners, and traders—while 
allocating burdens to a different group.180  Thus, under Michelman’s 
utilitarian analysis takings compensation for enslaved persons would 
be justified. 
b. Michelman’s fairness analysis 
Compensation is also appropriate if a redistribution is not “fair” 
under a Rawlsian fairness analysis.181  Redistribution which “impair[s] 
liberties unequally” requires compensation.182  Michelman suggests 
that compensation is required to achieve fairness under certain 
circumstances, including situations in which one party suffers an 
“unusually great” harm or in cases lacking “visible reciprocities of 
burden and benefit.”183 
                                                          
 179. Observers during the time of slavery, however, may have felt differently.  
Their sentiments likely would depend on how confident they were that takings 
involving the confiscation of self-ownership would not be imposed on them.  To the 
extent that they felt that these types of takings were safely limited along racial lines, 
these observers would have been secure in their investment-backed expectations that 
such takings would not be imposed against them, and so they would not consider the 
takings “capricious” for their utilitarian purposes. 
 180. Any benefit slaves received from their forced labor, such as being able to eat 
some of the crops they grew, was incidental to the benefit their owners reaped from 
their labor, and would be of minimal weight when calculating benefit and harm.  See 
infra Section IV.A.2 (noting that slaves were not compensated). 
 181. Michelman employs John Rawls’s definition of fairness.  Rawls considers 
actions fair if they either accord no preferences to any party, or if they allow for 
disparities in treatment only in situations where all relevant parties could potentially 
be advantaged or disadvantaged, and the arrangement could reasonably benefit 
every participant.  Michelman, supra note 11, at 1219 (citing John Rawls, Justice as 
Fairness, 67 PHIL. REV. 164 (1958), reprinted in JUSTICE AND SOCIAL POLICY 80 
(Frederick A. Olafson ed., 1961); John Rawls, Constitutional Liberty and the Concept of 
Justice, in NOMOS VI:  JUSTICE  (C. Friedrich & J. Chapman eds., 1963; John Rawls, 
Sense of Justice, 72 PHIL. REV. 281 (1963)). 
 182. Michelman, supra note 11, at 1221.  The investigation under both the fairness 
and utilitarian analysis is to be long-term, with societal impositions viewed as 
evidence of trends or tendencies.  Impositions in the name of efficiency are thus 
permitted where “the disappointed claimant ought to be able to appreciate how such 
decisions might fit into a consistent practice which holds forth a lesser long-run risk 
to people like him than would any consistent practice which is naturally suggested by 
the opposite decision.”  Id. at 1223. 
 183. Id. 
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Michelman’s fairness analysis, which is based on many of the same 
factors as the utilitarian analysis, unsurprisingly results in a similar 
outcome.184  Fairness analysis suggests that compensation is 
appropriate where, among other things, a societal taking “has the 
effect of impairing liberties unequally”;185 where applicants are 
unlikely to agree, in the long term, that such takings functioned as 
part of a consistent practice that is less risky for groups to which they 
belong than a contrary practice would be; where harm is 
disproportionately focused on certain individuals; or where “visible 
reciprocities of burden and benefit” are not present.186 
Slavery is a taking that concentrates harm on certain individuals.  
There is no reciprocity in this taking.  The benefits accrue to one set 
of actors, while another set suffers the harm.  Slavery thus has the 
effect of “impairing liberties unequally” over the long term.187  
Therefore, takings compensation for slavery seems appropriate under 
Michelman’s fairness analysis, just as it is under his utilitarian analysis. 
4. Other commentators’ explanations 
There are other theories about the Takings Clause’s purpose that 
will not be fully examined here because of space constraints.  A quick 
survey of other scholars, however, shows support for principles 
compatible with takings compensation for slavery. 
Joseph Sax, for example, argues that government should be 
required to compensate injured parties when it confiscates property 
to increase its wealth, rather than to arbitrate disputes.188  William 
Fischel suggests compensation is appropriate for property owners 
who lack a voice in the political process and are forced to endure 
regulations that most people “would not willingly impose on 
themselves if they were outsiders to their own community.”189  Jeb 
Rubenfeld would require compensation when property is put to a 
public use.190  Daniel Farber proposes a “uniform rule” which would 
require the government to compensate all property owners from 
                                                          
 184. See supra note 173 (asserting that Michelman’s utilitarian analysis and his 
fairness analysis often have similar results). 
 185. Michelman, supra note 11, at 1221. 
 186. Id. at 1221-23. 
 187. An argument could be made that the taking is not unfair over the long term, 
given the possibility that slaves might, eventually become slave owners themselves 
and benefit from the taking.  Such an outcome seems unlikely.  The correlation of 
slavery with status as a member of a racial minority suggests that the same harms are 
likely to fall on the same groups over the long term. 
 188. Joseph Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 62-65 (1964). 
 189. FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 62. 
 190. See Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 1078-80. 
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whom it seizes land, thereby providing “horizontal equity” by 
ensuring that politically vulnerable groups are not denied 
compensation.191  Saul Levmore suggests that burdens created by 
government actions, which would be compensable in tort law if they 
resulted from a private party’s actions, should be compensable under 
the Takings Clause.192  The Takings Clause, he suggests, is intended to 
protect individual actors (non-repeat players) from being unfairly 
taken advantage of by interest group politics.193 
Despite their different approaches and beliefs regarding the 
purpose of the Takings Clause, the aforementioned commentators all 
put forth ideas that could potentially support an argument favoring 
compensation for the taking of slaves’ self-ownership.  In particular, 
Fischel’s, Farber’s, and Sax’s theories would seem to strongly favor 
compensation for slave takings.  Sax’s theory supports the idea of 
takings compensation for slavery, because slavery was a taking that 
increased the government’s wealth, and was not enacted to arbitrate 
disputes; Fischel’s theory supports compensation because slaves lack a 
voice in the political process, and most persons would not willingly 
impose a condition like slavery upon themselves; and Farber’s 
approach supports compensation because of its emphasis on 
protecting politically vulnerable groups.  Takings compensation for 
slavery, then, can be viewed as consistent with these leading scholars’ 
understandings of the purpose of the Takings Clause. 
B. Avoiding the Constitutional Endorsement Problem 
Slavery played a dominant, if unstated role, in the ratification of 
the Constitution.  Madison and other Framers realized that 
confrontation with southern leaders about the future of slavery was 
not politically feasible and that such debate could derail the 
Constitutional Convention.194  As such, the Framers sought to avoid 
the question of slavery at the Convention, thereby implicitly allowing 
the South to continue the practice.195  Had an abolitionist country 
been pursued, there would likely have been no federal government.196 
                                                          
 191. See Daniel Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 
279, 306-08 (1992). 
 192. See Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1350-
53 (1991). 
 193. See Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 287-
89 (1990). 
 194. See Finkelman, supra note 92, at 435-37 (arguing that James Madison 
maneuvered to prevent early debates on slavery out of a fear that they might 
prematurely end the convention). 
 195. See id. at 424 (arguing that the construction of the Constitution was in part 
based on an attempt to protect the interests of slaveowners); see also PAUL FINKELMAN, 
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Because the present federal structure only came into being as a 
result of a concession to slave states, the Constitution’s entire 
structure, Paul Finkelman writes, was anti-emancipation.197  For this 
reason, southerners saw the document as no threat to slavery.198  
However, to avoid antagonizing the North, the approval of a pro-
slavery constitution was accomplished through circumlocution—thus, 
the word “slavery” never appeared in the document until the 
Thirteenth Amendment was ratified.199 
The Constitution directly discusses slavery in five places:  the 
Three-Fifths Clause;200 the Importation Clause;201 the Fugitive Slave 
Clause;202 and two other incidental references.203  Finkelman contends 
                                                          
SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS:  RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 6-10 (1999) 
(noting that Southern delegates “tenaciously fought” for slaveowner’s interests, 
managed to inject the issue of slavery into “almost every debate,” and were generally 
successful in preserving those interests). 
 196. See, e.g., Finkelman, supra note 92, at 437-40 (contending that if the states that 
favored population-based representation could not have convinced the smaller states 
to compromise, the entire Constitutional Convention might have been derailed); id. 
at 453-56 (describing the “dirty compromise,” under which southern representatives 
to the Constitutional Convention agreed to support the Commerce Clause in 
exchange for northern support for the proscription on state export taxes—taxes 
which were considered an attack on slavery); cf. id. at 425-47 (noting abolitionist 
criticism of the compromise).  Wendell Phillips, an abolitionist, argued that the 
Nation as a whole went into the compromise knowingly and willingly.  WENDELL 
PHILLIPS, THE CONSTITUTION, A PRO-SLAVERY COMPACT 5 (1856). 
 197. See Finkelman, supra note 92, at 432 (stating that the Constitution created a 
federal government with limited powers that “ensured against emancipation”). 
 198. See id. at 432-33 (arguing that because the federal government created by the 
Constitution was not empowered to regulate the states directly, most Southerners did 
not feel that it threatened slavery, and as such, did not oppose its ratification). 
 199. See id. at 427 (noting that the Southern representatives to the constitutional 
convention conceded that, in place of the term “slavery,” the phrase “other persons” 
would instead be used in the Constitution). 
 200. The Three-Fifths Clause states, “Representatives and direct Taxes shall be 
apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, 
according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the 
whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, 
and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other Persons.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 2, cl. 3. 
 201. The Importation Clause states, “The Migration or Importation of such 
Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be 
prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, 
but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars 
for each Person.”  Id. § 9, cl. 1. 
 202. The Fugitive Slave Clause states, “No Person held to Service of Labour in one 
State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any 
Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labor, but shall be 
delivered upon Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labor may be due.”  Id. 
art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. 
 203. The first incidental reference reads, “No Capitation, or other direct, Tax 
shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before 
directed to be taken.”  Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.  That is, the method defined in the Three-
Fifths clause will be used to determine population for the purposes of taxation. 
The other incidental reference sets out the rules for amending the Constitution.  
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that, “taken together, these five provisions gave the South a strong 
claim to ‘special treatment’ for its peculiar institution.”204  In addition, 
a number of other constitutional clauses indirectly related to 
slavery.205 
This evidence suggests a potential constitutional endorsement 
problem:  If the Constitution allows or endorses slavery in some 
places (such as the various slave clauses), it might be inconsistent to 
read it as implicitly disallowing it in another.  This obstacle can be 
avoided by showing that there is reason either to disregard any 
implied endorsement or to limit it so as not affect the viability of a 
takings claim. 
There are several ways to do this.  First, one way to avoid this 
problem is by emphasizing that the constitutionality of slavery is not 
universally accepted.  A number of contemporaneous abolitionist 
                                                          
It states, “The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, 
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution . . . Provided that no Amendment 
which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in 
any Manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the Ninth Section of the first 
Article . . . .”  Id. art. V.  That is, the slavery clauses could not be modified by 
amendment prior to 1808. 
 204. See Finkelman, supra note 92, at 429 (noting that this claim is supported by 
the “extra political muscle” provided to southern states by the Three-Fifths Clause). 
 205. Finkelman asserts that slavery was affected and aided by the following clauses:  
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15  (empowering Congress to raise militias to “suppress 
Insurrections,” including slave rebellions); id. § 9, cl. 5 (prohibiting the federal 
government from taxing exports, thereby preventing indirect taxation on the 
exportation of slaves); id. § 10, cl. 2 (prohibiting state taxation of exports and 
imports, thereby preventing states in which slavery was not legal from taxing the 
products of slave labor); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (establishing the Electoral College, which 
ensured that voters in slaveholding states would play a disproportionate role in 
electing the President); id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (allowing new slave states to be 
admitted); id. § 4 (guaranteeing that the U.S. Government would protect states from 
“domestic violence,” including slave rebellions); id. art. V (ensuring that the slave 
states could prevent any constitutional prohibition of slavery, because of the three-
fourths majority necessary for the ratification of Constitutional amendments).  
Finkelman, supra note 92, at 429-30. 
Finkelman also discusses clauses that, while not inherently favoring slavery, 
ultimately protected it by way of later judicial interpretation of congressional act:  
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, the Naturalization Clause (granting Congress the power 
to prohibit the naturalization of non-whites); id. cl. 17, the Federal District Clause 
(allowing Congress the power to authorize and regulate slavery in Washington, 
D.C.); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, the Diversity Jurisdiction Clause (giving judges the power 
to prevent slaves and free Blacks from bringing suit in federal courts, by extending 
the right to sue in federal court only to “citizens” of different states, and not to 
inhabitants); id. art. IV, § 1, the Full Faith and Credit Clause (requiring each state to 
grant legal recognition to the laws and judicial proceedings of other states, thus 
obligating free states to recognize laws creating and protecting slavery); id. § 2, cl. 1, 
the Privileges and Immunities clause (mandating that citizens of all states be given 
equal rights in other states, but failing to extend these rights to Blacks); and id. § 3, 
cl. 2 (empowering Congress to regulate the territories so as to protect slavery).  
Finkelman, supra note 92, at 430-32. 
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scholars argued that slavery was unconstitutional.206  The strength of 
their arguments is magnified by the eventual vindication of their 
cause.  While slavery was not abolished until the passage of the 
Thirteenth Amendment,207 it can be considered unconstitutional 
prior to that time; the Thirteenth Amendment ended slavery without 
directly affecting any constitutional text except the slave clauses, 
suggesting that any implied endorsement did not have full 
constitutional approval. 
The slavery clauses expired early in the nation’s history and were 
completely mooted by the Thirteenth Amendment.  Further, 
nowhere else in the Constitution is there any affirmation of the 
validity of slavery.  If slavery was already unconstitutional—an 
appealing conclusion—then there was no implicit endorsement of 
slavery. 
Second, any implied endorsement of slavery is almost certainly at 
odds with modern law.  If the government were to enact new laws 
allowing slavery, a strong case could be made that victims would be 
entitled to takings compensation.208  The stark difference between 
modern law and any prior slavery endorsement suggest that society 
does not have a strong reason to honor any prior endorsement.209 
Third, the Takings Clause’s general language is strong enough to 
override any suggestions that the slave clauses act to contradict it.  
                                                          
 206. See, e.g., GEORGE W. F. MELLEN, AN ARGUMENT ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF SLAVERY (1841) (arguing that the states violated the Constitution when they 
secured slavery); LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY (1860) 
(arguing that absolute rights—the rights which “God and nature” created—are 
vested in all humankind, and, accordingly, slavery, which restricts the absolute right 
of liberty, has never been constitutional); JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE 
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 7 (Mnemosyne 1969) (n.d.) (stating that 
if slavery were constitutional, the federal government would have had to guarantee, 
and thereby enforce, slavery); Frederick Douglass, The American Constitution and the 
Slave:  An Address Delivered in Glasgow, Scotland, on 26 March 1860, in 3 THE FREDERICK 
DOUGLASS PAPERS, SERIES ONE:  SPEECHES, DEBATES AND INTERVIEWS 340-66 (John W. 
Blassingame ed., 1985) (advocating that the Constitution is not a slave-holding 
instrument, and as such does not, and never did, guarantee the right for one group 
of people to enslave another group).  For a modern discussion of these arguments, 
see Randy E. Barnett, Essay, Was Slavery Unconstitutional Before the Thirteenth 
Amendment?:  Lysander Spooner;s Theory of Interpretation, 28 PAC. L.J. 977, 988-1014 
(1997) (examining Spooner’s theory and arguing that it is superior to alternative 
theories). 
 207. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, 
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, 
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction”). 
 208. Of course, other compensation would probably also be available. 
 209. Discounting of any constitutional implication of slavery because of changed 
modern law requires one to apply the modern law retroactively.  The history of 
takings law—and of common law in general—has been one of retroactive application 
of legal standards.  See discussion infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing retroactivity 
objections). 
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Even if the Framers believed that the Takings Clause, as drafted, did 
not require compensation for slavery, the text itself is what was 
ratified.  As Richard Epstein suggests, “the dominant loyalty is not to 
the framers’ views [if any] of the consequences it entailed.”210  It is 
possible that the Framers meant to endorse both the Takings Clause 
and any idea contrary to its text without being aware of the implicit 
tension between the two.211  Their explicit decision to endorse the 
text of Takings Clause takes precedence over their silent belief that 
other constitutional provisions inherently limit the clause’s effect.212  
If in conflict with the text, the “unwritten expectations of the 
framers . . . must yield to the internal written logic of the text.”213  
This approach allows any expectation by the Framers that slavery 
would not require compensation to yield to the text’s internal written 
logic that slavery is compensable.214  Epstein suggests that the Framers 
drafted the clause in general terms, with the question of how it 
applied to particular situations left for future generations to 
uncover.215  Thus, Epstein posits, the correct attitude towards the 
Framers view, if any, is “ambivalence toward[s] historical sources.”216  
This corresponds to the analysis already set forth:  There is no direct 
evidence that the Framers viewed the Takings Clause as inapplicable 
to slavery, and even if they had, that expectation would properly be 
ignored.217  This textualist argument—relying on the text of the 
                                                          
 210. EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 28.  Epstein uses this analysis to argue that wage 
controls, which may not have been considered by the Framers to be compensable 
within the Takings Clause, are in fact a taking.  Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id.  One manner in which slavery differs from Epstein’s analysis, of course, is 
that he is dealing with application of takings to a novel situation.  The Framers never 
dealt with rent control, workers’ compensation, issues surrounding oil and gas 
interests, or the details involved with zoning.  Id.  To the extent that Epstein’s 
argument relies on this element of novelty, it is less persuasive in the area of slavery, 
which the framers were painfully familiar with.  However, Epstein’s analysis and his 
general propositions do not seem restricted to areas of novelty.  While they may have 
even more weight in those areas, they certainly have potent persuasive power even in 
areas of law, such as slavery, with which the Framers were familiar. 
 213. Id. 
 214. See id. at 29. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Sketchy support for resolving the ambiguity in favor of compensation can be 
found in the fact that the Bill of Rights, as amendments, technically were adopted 
after the body of the Constitution and thus might benefit from the “later in time” 
rule.  However, any later-in-time application is dubious since the two documents were 
adopted essentially at the same time.  There are also representation problems with 
this argument.  That is, the southern states likely would have balked if they had 
realized that they were forcing compensation for slavery. It seems unfair to ascribe to 
them support for this idea; such a late shift is suspect on grounds of democratic 
accountability. 
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clause, rather than any subjective intent of the Framers218—leads to 
the same conclusion as more liberal arguments.219 
Fourth, even if the Constitution endorses slavery, the limited scope 
of that endorsement means that takings claims are not barred.  The 
slavery clauses do not endorse slavery, nor do they express a 
government’s desire to protect slave owners or prevent any 
compensation to slaves.  The three main slavery clauses have no 
bearing at all on takings compensation:  Neither the Three-Fifths 
Clause, the Importation Clause, nor the Fugitive Slave Clause is 
inconsistent with the idea of compensation to slaves for their taken 
self-ownership.220 
Fifth, assuming that the Constitution endorses slavery, such 
endorsement is consistent with requiring takings compensation for 
any harm caused.  Indeed, even explicit constitutional approval of a 
practice does not preclude a requirement of takings compensation if 
property is taken pursuant to that authority.221  For example, 
government may seize property under the War Power, or regulate 
trade under the Commerce Power, yet still trigger the Takings Clause 
requirement of compensation.  Similarly, acts undertaken pursuant 
to any constitutional endorsement of slavery may still require 
compensation under the Takings Clause.   
In summary, constitutional endorsement of slavery, if it exists, does 
not prevent a takings claim.  Such endorsement was contested at the 
time slavery existed, and is certainly out of step with modern law.  It 
goes against the strong language of the clause itself.  Finally, it is 
sufficiently limited in scope that it does not affect takings claims. 
                                                          
 218. This argument is textualist in that it relies on the text of the clause.  However, 
if the Framers did not believe that the Takings Clause governed slavery, and if that 
belief was widely held among the populace, this argument may not comport with 
versions of textualism or originalism that rely on contemporaneous definitions. 
 219. The Supreme Court has allowed the Takings Clause to be applied to many 
types of cases that were not contemplated by the Framers—most prominently to 
regulatory takings.  See infra notes 285-287. 
 220. In fact, as noted above, the language of the Fugitive Slave clause suggests that 
slavery was a creation of regulation, a man-made blemish upon the underlying 
baseline of freedom.  See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text. 
 221. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 172 (1979) (recognizing 
that proper exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority does not create a 
“blanket exception to the Takings Clause” of the Fifth Amendment); United States v. 
Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. 261 (1950) (noting that the United States 
was responsible for compensating the lessee of condemned property taken by the 
government pursuant to its War Powers). 
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IV. THE PRIMA FACIE TAKINGS CASE 
This Part addresses what would be required for a takings case based 
on the slavery takings.  Section A discusses the elements of a Takings 
Clause violation, and section B discusses defenses likely to arise in 
response to such an action. 
A. Elements of a Takings Clause Violation 
The Takings Clause states, “nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.”222  A Takings Clause violation 
claim has four prerequisites.  First, private property must exist.  
Second, this property must be taken by the government.223  Third, the 
taking must be for public use.224  Fourth, the original owner must 
have not been compensated for the taking.225  This Article has already 
examined the first two elements:  private property226 and taking by the 
government.227  This section examines the remaining two elements 
that would need to be established to show a prima facie case:  public 
use and lack of compensation. 
1. Public use 
The public use requirement is unlikely to be an obstacle for three 
reasons.  First, under the case law, public use has not been strictly 
required in regulatory takings cases.228  Second, in instances where 
public use is required, courts have been extremely lenient and 
allowed compensation based on the thinnest reeds of public use.229  
                                                          
 222. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 223. In many cases, these first two elements are combined, since the existence of 
private property can often be assumed.  See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm’n, 505 
U.S. 1003 (1992).  In this Article they have been examined separately, since there is a 
potential question about the existence of private property. 
 224. Brown v. Legal Found. of Washington, 123 S. Ct. 1406, 1417 (2003). 
 225. Id. 
 226. See supra Part I (discussing property right of self-ownership). 
 227. See supra Part II (discussing slavery as a taking). 
 228. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302, 323-24 (2002) (acknowledging the distinction between acquisitions of property 
for public use and regulations prohibiting private uses of property, thereby making it 
inappropriate for courts to treat physical takings cases as controlling precedents for 
regulatory takings cases). 
 229. One important case in this area is Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of 
Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 462-63 (Mich. 1981), which held that a large private 
company taking property of homeowners in order to expand its factory constituted a 
public use.  In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1984), the 
Supreme Court determined that private land taken from landowners and 
redistributed to homeowners and lessees under a legislative scheme intended to 
break up large parcels historically controlled by a land oligopoly constituted a public 
use.  Breaking up the private land was found to have the public use of “[r]egulating 
oligopoly and the evils associated with it.”  Id. at 241-43.  The case law has led one 
scholar to characterize the public use requirement as “extremely permissive.”  
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The Supreme Court has written that, “where the exercise of the 
eminent domain powers is rationally related to a conceivable public 
purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be 
proscribed by the Public Use Clause.”230 
Third, even if a concrete public use were needed, it is clear that 
slavery had important public uses.  Slavery allowed for agricultural 
advances, particularly the cultivation of tobacco, which sustained 
large segments of the colonial economies.231  Slavery allowed 
plantation owners to receive acceptable returns on invested capital, 
encouraging them to invest in their plantations.232  Numerous 
economic studies have demonstrated that the Southern economy was 
driven by slave labor, with which it was able to maintain profitability 
and growth.233  One estimate is that slaves contributed $40 million to 
the U.S. economy between 1790 and 1860 alone.234 
Governments also directly reaped benefits from the legality of 
slavery.  One major area in which governments benefited was in 
revenue from slave taxes.  One scholar notes that, beginning with 
colonial times and continuing throughout the Civil War, slave taxes 
raised more revenue for the American governments than any other 
source.235  Property taxes on slaves comprised a majority or a near-
majority of property tax revenue in North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, Virginia, Maryland, and other southern states.236  Prior to the 
ratification of the Constitution, slave imports were also a significant 
                                                          
FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 72. 
 230. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241. 
 231. BELL, supra note 3, at 49 (noting that slave labor significantly impacted the 
colonies’ growth and development in the eighteenth century); G. Melvin Herndon, 
Tobacco, in DICTIONARY OF AFRO-AMERICAN SLAVERY, supra note 71, at 735 (noting that 
once tobacco began to be produced in large quantities, plantations shifted to 
primarily slave labor); JAMES WALVIN, BLACK IVORY:  A HISTORY OF BRITISH SLAVERY 8-10 
(1992) (discussing how Maryland and Virginia profited greatly from tobacco because 
of slave labor); see also Outterson, supra note 91, at 138-40 (noting the economic 
benefits of slavery, including tobacco cultivation). 
 232. Harold D. Woodman, Profitability of Slavery, in DICTIONARY OF AFRO-AMERICAN 
SLAVERY, supra note 71, at 592, 595-96 (acknowledging that slavery was economically 
profitable, but also suggesting that slavery profited whites socially by allowing them to 
stay in control). 
 233. Id.; Outterson, supra note 91, at 138-40 (providing specific economic statistics 
as to how each state profited as a result of slavery). 
 234. Complaint and Jury Trial Demand ¶ 10, Farmer-Paellmann v. FleetBoston 
Fin. Corp., No. CV-02-1862 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002).  The current value of that 
amount, though difficult to pin down, is probably in the trillions of dollars.  See 
Matthew Kaufman, The Cost of Slavery was High, But Who Will Pay It?, HARTFORD 
COURANT, Sept. 29, 2002, at 75-76 (noting estimates ranging from $2 trillion to $12 
trillion); see also Robert Browne, The Economic Case for Reparations to Black America, 62 
AM. ECON. REV. 39, 39-46 (1972) (calculating various possible methods for valuing 
slave labor). 
 235. Outterson, supra note 91, at 135. 
 236. Id. at 138-40. 
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source of tax revenue.237  Governments depended largely on property 
taxes and taxes on imports—income taxes would not become 
constitutionally acceptable until the passage of the Sixteenth 
Amendment in 1913.238 
Even if taxes are not considered evidence of public use, 
governments benefited in many other ways from slavery.  Local 
governments auctioned off unclaimed vagrant slaves, contraband 
slaves, and sometimes slaves of intestates.239  These sales were no small 
matter; for example, one scholar estimates that half of South 
Carolina’s annual slave sales were court-conducted sales caused by 
probate auctions, mortgage foreclosures, and sheriffs’ seizures of 
debtors’ property.240  Other local governments reaped similar 
benefits.241 
The federal government also profited from slavery.  The 
Continental Congress levied funds from the states, much of which 
had been derived in the first instance from slave taxes.242  The federal 
government also imposed slave property taxes twice, and incredibly, 
auctioned off the slaves who were aboard ships seized for slave 
trading after the transatlantic trade was outlawed in 1808.243 
In addition to direct benefits, governments received indirect 
benefits.  One such benefit was the availability of cheap labor.244  
Another was taxation on slave products, such as tobacco and cotton.245  
In sum, the direct and indirect benefits governments received from 
slavery are sufficient to satisfy the public use requirement. 
                                                          
 237. Id. at 138-40, 144-45.  Through direct and indirect taxes, slavery “supported 
the bulk of the revenue needs of Southern governments.”  Id. at 147. 
 238. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (granting Congress the “power to lay and collect 
taxes in incomes”).  
 239. See Russell, supra note 80, at 484-90 (highlighting individual stories of slaves 
travelling on a seized ship who were delivered to New Orleans’ local sheriff’s 
department and sold). 
 240. See Russell, supra note 80, at 485-87 (“South Carolina’s courts operated as a 
great auctioneering firm.  The various agents of the courts drew profits from the sale 
of slaves in the form of commissions, just as commission-merchants did.”). 
 241. Outterson, supra note 91, at 138-40, 144 (discussing that Maryland and 
Virginia profited off of tobacco because of slave labor, and Florida, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi benefited from high slave taxes). 
 242. Id. at 144. 
 243. Id. at 145-46. 
 244. See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 2-6 (chronicling government use of cheap 
slave labor to build the Capitol building). 
 245. See Outterson, supra note 91, at 147-48 (noting that in addition to providing 
exports which could be taxed, slave labor also created wealth for slave owners, who 
could then purchase imports which were also taxed). 
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2. Lack of compensation 
The final element for showing a compensable taking is to establish 
that slaves were not compensated.  It is axiomatic that slaves were not 
paid for their services.  However, it could conceivably be argued that 
they were otherwise remunerated, either through emancipation or 
through transport to the New World.246 
After the original taking of their self-possession, slaves had one 
major group interaction with government:  their emancipation.  
Though emancipation was a beneficial government act from the 
point of view of those freed, it does not constitute compensation 
because emancipation itself provided no monetary relief. 
One popular idea accompanying emancipation was to give freed 
slaves forty acres of land and certain surplus and seized army animals 
(often characterized as “forty acres and a mule”).247  President 
Johnson, bowing to political pressure, killed the legislation, and the 
freed slaves instead received nothing.248  It is possible that, had such 
                                                          
 246. Some conservative opponents of reparations have argued that certain 
governmental programs which benefit Blacks suffice as compensation.  See, e.g., John 
McWhorter, Against Reparations, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 23, 2001, at 32, 36-37 
(asserting that the large and unprecedented expansion of welfare over the past forty 
years should be considered as constituting reparations).  Cf. Outterson, supra note 
91, at 136 (noting the argument sometimes made that events in American history, 
such as the Civil War and emancipation, coupled with the New Deal and affirmative 
action, effectively constitute reparations). 
As a general matter, this argument seems dubious.  Welfare payments are income 
based and are made irrespective of one’s race or ancestry.  Plus, numerous slave 
descendants are ineligible for welfare.  Cf. Kenneth Brooks, Social Contradictions, 
VALLEJO TIMES-HERALD, Aug. 26, 2002 (“Being poor is not and should not be a 
requirement for receiving compensation for inhumane treatment.”), available at 
http://timesheraldonline.com/articles/2002/08/28/export2814.txt (on file with 
the American University Law Review). 
The characterization of welfare as takings compensation would be especially 
inappropriate.  No court or commentator has suggested that takings victims are 
limited in their ability to bring takings claims by the presence or absence of receipt 
of other government monies.  To adapt the fact pattern of a well-known takings case, 
even if a developer received tax breaks, development grants, or other government 
aid, he may still properly bring a takings claim if a state takes his property by 
regulation.  See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).  One’s ability to 
bring a takings claim is independent of other government payments.  In fact, if 
welfare is a reparation, then Blacks are being “taken” once again, since whites are the 
numerical majority of welfare recipients.  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVICES, CHARACTERISTICS AND FINANCIAL CONDITION OF AFDC RECIPIENTS, FISCAL 
YEAR 1992 47 (1992) (noting that whites constituted thirty-nine percent of welfare 
recipients in 1992, while Blacks were only thirty-seven percent of recipients). 
 247. The forty acres idea originated with General Sherman’s Special Field Order 
No. 15, in which he ordered that certain seized confederate land be distributed to 
freed slaves, who would receive forty acres each.  See Special Field Order No. 15, in 
WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 3, at 365-66.  Following Sherman’s order, 
Radical Republicans proposed legislation granting forty acres to each freed slave.  See 
Lopez, supra note 5, at 653-55. 
 248. Id. at 654; see Chisolm, supra note 5, at 685-87 (noting that the Freedman’s 
Bureau Act of 1865, if passed, would have allowed for up to three million acres of 
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awards been given, they could have served as full or partial 
compensation for the government taking.  However, the 
compensation requirement is not satisfied by an unmet promise. 
Slaves did have their taken property, their self-ownership, restored 
to them through emancipation.249  However, restoration of taken 
property is not sufficient compensation in takings claims.  
Government must pay compensation for the time it possessed the 
property—rent, so to speak.250  Case law is clear the question of 
whether a taking is worthy of compensation hinges not at all upon 
whether the act was permanent or temporary; the just compensation 
clause does not differentiate between the two.251 
An argument could be made that transportation to the New World 
was itself compensation.  On the surface, this argument has some 
appeal.  Transatlantic fares cost hundreds or thousands of dollars in 
today’s money.  Other cases have allowed “in kind compensation” to 
meet constitutional requirements.252  However, any characterization 
                                                          
land to freed slaves). 
 249. “Emancipation” as used here refers to all government actions to end slavery, 
which took place at different times in different states.  Most Northern states ended 
slavery years before the Civil War.  For example, slavery in Massachusetts was 
gradually ended after the adoption of the Massachusetts Constitution in 1780 and 
the subsequent judicial interpretation of that constitution as prohibiting slavery.  
HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 18, at 89-99.  Pennsylvania passed legislation in 1780, 
which provided for the “Gradual Abolition” of slaves.  Id. at 299.  Under that law, all 
children born to slaves after passage of the law would serve their masters until the 
age of twenty-eight, after which they would be free.  Id. at 299-304.  Pennsylvania also 
passed a law in 1788 restricting interstate travel of slaves to prevent slave traders from 
taking pregnant slaves out of the state to avoid emancipation.  Id. at 304-05. 
New York, needing soldiers to help fight the Revolutionary War and alarmed that 
slaves might join the British, passed legislation in 1781 authorizing manumission of 
slaves who fought in the war.  Id. at 137-38.  In 1785, New York attempted to ban the 
slave trade, although the law had easily exploitable loopholes.  In 1788, New York 
banned the export of slaves to other states to close those loopholes, and in 1799, 
finally passed a law to gradually emancipate the slaves.  Children born to slave 
mothers were to become free at the age of twenty-eight for men and twenty-five for 
women.  Finally, in 1817, New York passed a law which ended slavery by 1855.  Id. at 
138-47.  Slaves in Southern states were freed by action of the emancipation 
proclamation.  Slaves in border states were not affected by the emancipation 
proclamation and were freed by operation of the Thirteenth Amendment. 
 250. Cf. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261-62 (1946) (suggesting payment 
for the use of owner’s land is analogous to interest). 
 251. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 
304, 318 (1987) (explaining that denying a landowner the use of his property is a 
taking whether it is temporary or permanent).  But cf. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 
Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 306, 319-20 (2002) (finding no 
per se physical taking where regulation prevented development for a period of thirty-
two months). 
 252. As early as Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, in 1922, the Court recognized that 
some government acts provide “an average reciprocity of advantage that has been 
recognized as a justification of various laws.”  260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).  For example, 
government seizure of some zoning or development rights, accompanied by the 
provision of other rights, can provide adequate compensation so as to defuse a 
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of transportation as in-kind compensation is entirely inappropriate.  
Unlike voluntary immigration, transportation was forced on slaves.253  
It subjected slaves to horrendous conditions that commonly killed a 
third or more of a ship’s “cargo.”254  It therefore cannot satisfy the just 
compensation requirement.255 
B. Defenses 
There are three primary defenses that might be asserted against a 
takings claim:256 statute of limitations, sovereign immunity, and 
retroactivity.257  Each is examined in this Section. 
                                                          
takings claim.  See, e.g., Pa. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 137-38 
(1978) (failing to find a compensable taking in city landmark law due in part to city’s 
provision to landowner of other development rights). 
 253. Not only did slaves not choose to come to America, there has been a strong 
“Back to Africa” element in much of Black political discourse, exemplified by the 
work of Marcus Garvey.  See generally Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic 
Development as Progressive Politics, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399, 412 n.48 (2001) (citing 
literature that discusses the impact of Marcus Garvey’s advocation in the 1920s that 
Blacks migrate back to Africa).  See also AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE:  HOW EXPORTING 
FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY 195-97, 210 
(2003) (criticizing the paternalistic idea that most people in other countries would 
prefer to be in America). 
 254.   One case brought by insurers to recover the value of lost “property” 
illustrates the generally brutal treatment of slaves in transit.  The court noted: 
 [S]ixty negroes died for want of water for sustenance; and forty others, for 
want of water for sustenance, and through thirst and frenzy thereby 
occasioned, threw themselves into the sea and were drowned; and the master 
and mariners, for the preservation of their own lives, and the lives of the rest 
of the negroes, which for want of water they could not otherwise preserve, 
were obliged to throw overboard 150 other negroes. 
Gregson v. Gilbert, 99 Eng. Rep. 629, 629 (K.B. 1783). 
 255. Even if transportation could be considered compensation for the slaves who 
survived, the numerous slaves who died in transit were not compensated. 
 256. Other special defenses exist in Takings Clause jurisprudence, but none of 
these are applicable in the slavery context.  For example, the government is generally 
not required to pay compensation where a taking is intended to remedy a nuisance, 
rather than to increase societal wealth.  Such takings—for example, shutting down a 
plant emitting noxious fumes—are properly viewed as exercises of the police power, 
rather than the takings power.  EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 110-21; FISCHEL, supra note 
11, at 59-61.  This exception is not applicable to the taking of slaves’ self-ownership. 
The Takings Clause is subject to a host of other sundry defenses under certain 
situations that are inapplicable in the context of slavery.  See, e.g., Benjamin 
Longstreth, Note, Protecting “The Wastes of the Foreshore”:  The Federal Navigational 
Servitude and its Origins in State Public Trust Doctrine, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 471, 471 
(2002) (noting that under the navigational servitude doctrine, the federal 
government is not required to pay compensation to private interests if they are 
regulating navigable waters to protect navigation). 
 257. Each of these defenses would be raised by the government.  Private actors are 
not likely to have standing to challenge a takings suit.  Cf. Posner & Vermeule, supra 
note 153, at 714 (discussing the lack of standing to challenge descendancy-based 
reparations scheme).  But cf. id. at 716-18 (noting possibility that plaintiffs might have 
standing to challenge racially-based schemes). 
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1. Statute of limitations 
In federal cases, the normal statute of limitations for bringing a 
claim is six years.258  Unless the statutory defense can be avoided, any 
takings claim based on slavery would be barred because of the time 
elapsed since the taking.259  However, there are several exceptions to 
the statute of limitations that could apply. 
An initial route is to argue that the statute should be tolled because 
of an inability in bringing claims at an earlier date.260  Claims against 
states could not be brought under federal law until incorporation.261  
In addition, claims were de facto barred for many years by rules, both 
explicit and implicit, denying Blacks access to the courts.262  Thus, any 
inability on the part of slave descendants to bring an action earlier 
stems not from their own inaction or “sleeping on their rights,” but 
rather from societal flaws over which they had no control.263  In such 
circumstances, it makes sense to prohibit the state from raising delay-
based defenses when the state’s actions contributed to the inability to 
seek a remedy earlier.  This is similar to the “discovery rule” where a 
statute of limitations is tolled until the harm is discovered.264  Here, 
                                                          
 258. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (2002). 
 259. The only Takings Clause claim brought by Japanese Americans for lost 
property due to internment during World War II was dismissed after a long 
procedural battle, on grounds of government immunity and statute of limitations.  
Hohri v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1984).  See generally Magee, supra 
note 5 (detailing the history of Hohri dismissal and the difficulties in obtaining 
successful reparations claims). 
 260. See generally 4 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 1056, at 255-63 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing how the principle of equitable tolling can 
halt the running of a statute of limitations if the plaintiff uses reasonable care to 
learn the facts that would discover the defendant’s wrongful acts).  But cf. Hair v. 
United States, No. 02-5115, 2003 WL 22805336, at *6-*8 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 26, 2003) 
(finding that the government need not provide “notice” of its refusal to pay claims in 
order to begin the statute of limitations period). 
 261. See generally Van Dyke, supra note 20, at 76 (alleging that, until the federal 
government properly enforced the Fourteenth Amendment, the immunity enjoyed 
by states would continue); Does America Owe a Debt to Descendants of its Slaves, supra 
note 4, at 83 (“[N]o former slave could have sued in, say, 1870 and expected to get a 
hearing”). 
 262. See Christopher Waldrop, Black Access to Law in Reconstruction: The Case of 
Warren County, Mississippi, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 583, 583-84 (1994) (arguing that 
freed slaves did not feel fully free to use the legal system and that the failure of 
reformers to “fully open the legal system to freed slaves” doomed reconstruction and 
increased white supremacy).   
 263. Because slaves had no control over these societal flaws, the situation is 
analogous to the doctrine of futility in administrative law contexts.  See generally 
Robert C. Power, Help Is Sometimes Close at Hand:  The Exhaustion Problem and the 
Ripeness Solution, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 547, 578-79 (1987) (describing the futility 
exception to administrative exhaustion requirements, which holds that where further 
administrative proceedings would be futile, delaying judicial review until their 
completion is unnecessary). 
 264. See, e.g., Diamond v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 397 So. 2d 671, 671-72 (Fla. 
1981) (tolling statute of limitations in suit against a chemical manufacturer where 
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the legally cognizable harm was not practically able to be addressed 
in court until recently. 
Similarly, a case can be made that the taking behavior is 
continuing, in which case no statute of limitations applies.265  As self-
ownership is an inalienable right, any taking can be considered 
continuous.  Each day, the government designated slaves as property 
and illegitimately confiscated their inalienable property right of self-
ownership.  As this seizure was illegitimate, it could not affect the 
underlying inalienability of the property, and therefore a similar 
taking necessarily occurred the next day, and the next, and so on.  
Every time the government reasserted slaves’ status as the property of 
others, slaves’ inalienable self-ownership property rights were 
retaken.  Because the transfer of property interests was never 
legitimate, even slaves who were born into the slavery system—never 
having experienced uncontested control of their self-ownership—
were takings victims.266 
It is also possible to argue that the original taking and the 
derivative harm are part of the same takings transaction.  That is, not 
only was slavery a taking, but it was part of a continuous taking, still in 
effect today, from Blacks.  Under that view, the entire treatment of 
Blacks, from slavery up to modern discrimination, constitutes part of 
the same taking. 
Statutes of limitation are also subject to specific exceptions for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.  The United Nations 
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War 
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity is clear in that it forbids 
statutory limitations in two situations:  war crimes and crimes against 
                                                          
the harm was not discovered until twenty years after actual tort). 
 265. See Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117, 134-36 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(tolling statute of limitations because of defendant bank’s “continued denial and 
failure to return the looted assets to plaintiffs”); Morris A. Ratner, Factors Impacting 
the Selection and Positioning of Human Rights Class Actions in the United States Courts, 58 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 623, 627-29 (2002) (stating that the victims of human rights 
abuses are often prevented by their abuse from pursuing litigation until after the 
statute of limitations has run and suggesting that equitable tolling principles may 
provide a solution). 
Similarly, the slavery taking behavior is continuous because the state has made no 
attempt to reimburse slaves for the taking of their self-ownership property rights, yet 
continues to profit from this taking.  Cf. Adjoa A. Aiyetoro, Formulating Reparations 
Litigation Through the Eyes of the Movement, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 457, 470-71 
(2002) (discussing the unfairness of using a statute of limitations in adjudication with 
respect to the idea of continuing harm).  But see Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 
1108 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting a continuous harm argument when dismissing a tort-
based reparations claims on statute of limitations grounds). 
 266. See infra notes 323-324 and accompanying text (discussing the potential for a 
takings claim, regardless of when the claimant obtained title). 
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humanity.267  This Convention applies directly to criminal 
prosecutions and does not speak to other legal actions.268  However, it 
seems consistent to suggest that a taking or other legal action, if 
committed incident to a war crime or crime against humanity, would 
be within the aegis of the Convention, and hence not subject to 
statutes of limitations.269  Though the convention was not adopted 
until 1968, it was designed to operate retroactively.270 
The taking of slaves’ property rights of self-ownership might fit 
under either of these two exceptions.  Slavery was a war crime, 
because slaves were generally taken through wars.271  In fact, the 
                                                          
 267. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and 
Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2391, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 40, 
U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968) [hereinafter Convention].  See also Does America Owe a Debt to 
the Descendants of Its Slaves?, supra note 4, at 83 (discussing the necessity of the war 
crimes and the crimes against humanity exceptions in light of the absolutely serious 
nature of the crimes). 
 268. Convention, supra note 267, at 40. 
 269. Cf. Does America Owe a Debt to the Descendants of its Slaves?, supra note 4, at 83 
(suggesting that standard reparations claims could rely on these two exceptions). 
 270. See Duc V. Trang, Beyond the Historical Justice Debate:  The Incorporation of 
International Law and the Impact on Constitutional Structures and Rights in Hungary, 28 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 3-6 (1995) (discussing a Hungarian case wherein a draft law 
that allowed for the prosecution of crimes committed during an uprising in the 
1950s, which contained explicit reference to the Convention, was upheld despite its 
retroactive application); Jean-Olivier Viout, The Klaus Barbie Trial and Crimes Against 
Humanity, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 155, 159-61 (1999) (discussing a French case 
against a former Nazi in which the Convention rules were applies retroactively); cf. 
Matthew Lippman, Crimes Against Humanity, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 171, 190-92, 
232-38 (1997) (discussing how statutory limitations threaten application of justice 
against Nazi war criminals). 
The retroactive application of the treaty is subject to some limitations.  It is always 
problematic to apply modern standards to acts completed when the world looked at 
rights differently.  It is possible that slavery gradually became a crime against 
humanity and therefore escaped notice by the legislatures and executive.  However, 
abolitionist arguments may have put the United States on notice of this change.  
Discussions of the evils of slavery, such as Chief Justice Marshall’s Antelope opinion, 
may provide evidence that the United States was on notice that slavery constituted a 
crime against humanity.  See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 120 (1825). 
There was also widespread belief that slavery was wrong even as it was condoned.  
The abolition of the slave trade and the universal abolition of slavery late in the 
nineteenth century—less than a generation after its abolition in the United States—
suggest knowledge that slavery was a crime against humanity.  Thus, application of 
the U.N. treaty to circumvent the statute of limitations does not open up the “can of 
worms” which allows the Romans to sue the Vandals for the sack of Rome.  This 
objection has been discussed at some length in the traditional tort-based reparations 
literature.  See Armstrong Williams, Presumed Victims, in SHOULD AMERICA PAY?, supra 
note 4, at 165, 170 (suggesting that granting reparations raises concerns about giving 
restitution to other wronged groups throughout history); Matsuda, supra note 19, at 
384-85 (discussing the slippery slope and “outer limit” objections to reparations); 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AN APPROACH TO REPARATIONS 1 (2001) (noting “practical 
limits” to time frame for reparations and suggesting that, due to the time problem, 
focusing on “contemporary effects” of human rights abuses is most appropriate). 
 271. See BOAHEN ET AL., supra note 71, at 108-10 (discussing capture of slaves by 
war). 
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definition of “war crimes” used by the Nuremberg tribunal included 
slavery.272  Equally convincing is an argument that the taking involved 
in slavery occurred incident to a crime against humanity, and thus no 
statute of limitations bar can be raised.  Slavery is not difficult to 
characterize as a crime against humanity.  It is held in universal 
opprobrium.  Any attempt to institute a regime of slavery today would 
qualify as a crime against humanity.273  “If there ever was a crime upon 
humanity, what white folks did to black people is the worst,” suggests 
one commentator.274 
Statutes of limitations also do not apply where a defendant has 
engaged in fraudulent concealment.275  Fraudulent concealment in 
general requires that a plaintiff “prove that the defendant concealed 
the wrong and that as a result the plaintiff could not, with due 
diligence, have discovered his claim.”276  Accordingly, an argument 
can be made that government acts to limit the ability of Blacks to 
bring claims in court were the equivalent of fraudulent concealment 
of the taking.  Government policies limiting access to court by Blacks 
                                                          
 272. Article 6 of the London Agreement defines war crimes as: 
[V]iolations of the laws or customs of war.  Such violations shall include, but 
not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for 
any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder 
or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, 
plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or 
villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity. 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, in Agreement For the Prosecution 
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 
6, 59 Stat. 1544. 
 273. But see Chris McGreal, Britain Blocks EU Apology for Slave Trade, GUARDIAN, 
Sept. 3, 2001, at 2 (noting that at the 2001 United Nations Conference on Racism, 
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, delegates from many 
African nations unsuccessfully urged the European Union to characterize the slave 
trade as a crime against humanity). 
 274. SHOULD AMERICA PAY?, supra note 4, at 83; see also Roger Wareham, The 
Popularization of the International Demand for Reparations for African People, in SHOULD 
AMERICA PAY?, supra note 4, at 226, 230-36 (describing slavery as a crime against 
humanity).  Chief Justice Marshall’s Antelope opinion, discussed earlier, could 
support a conclusion that the United States knew slavery was a crime against 
humanity.  See discussion supra note 34.  But see Aiyetoro, supra note 265, at 469-71 
(noting difficulties in making the case for slavery as a crime against humanity). 
 275. See, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946) (making an 
exception for the statute of limitations in all federal cases where the plaintiff has 
been defrauded but is unaware of the violation, and preventing the statute of 
limitations from starting until after the fraud is discovered); King & King Enters. v. 
Champlin Petroleum Co., 446 F. Supp. 906, 910 (E.D. Okla. 1978) (citing Holmberg 
and other Supreme Court and circuit court precedent when stating the threshold 
proposition that, “[i]t is settled that the fraudulent concealment of a cause of action 
tolls a statute of limitations and that this federal fraudulent concealment rule is read 
into every federal statute of limitations”). 
 276. Richard L. Marcus, Fraudulent Concealment in Federal Court:  Toward a More 
Disparate Standard?, 71 GEO. L. J. 829, 855 (1983). 
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effectively concealed any remedy available to them, and this 
concealment provides support for tolling the statute of limitations. 
Finally, the statute of limitations can be avoided through a 
legislative act:  Congress could modify the statute.277 
2. Sovereign immunity 
 The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that in many 
instances, a government may not be sued without its permission.278  
Sovereign immunity has arisen in other reparations cases.  For 
example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld dismissal of the 
Cato litigation, which sought reparations for slavery, on grounds that 
the government had not waived its sovereign immunity.279 
However, recent decisions have established that the defense of 
sovereign immunity is not applicable to takings claims.  In First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,280 the Supreme 
Court noted that the remedy provided under the Takings Clause is 
“self-executing.”281  The requirement of compensation is based in the 
Constitution, the Court ruled, and fundamental to its notion of 
justice.282  This case makes clear that sovereign immunity is not a 
defense to takings claims. 
                                                          
 277. See Ratner, supra note 265, at 628-29 (discussing legislative extension of 
statutes of limitation); see also Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 313-15 
(1945) (upholding Congress’s ability to retrospectively alter statutes of limitation); 
SHOULD AMERICA PAY?, supra note 4, at 82 (suggesting that one way of avoiding the 
statute of limitations in a potential breach-of-contract case for slave reparations 
would be for Congress to intervene and waive the statute of limitations). 
Other specially tailored exceptions have been created by Congress or the courts 
before, such as with Indian land cases.  Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 691 F.2d 
1070, 1084 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating that “a suit by the United States as trustee on 
behalf of an Indian Tribe is not subject to state delay-based defenses” and that it 
would be “anomalous to allow the trustee to sue under more favorable conditions 
than those afforded the tribes themselves”). 
 278. See generally Van Dyke, supra note 20, at 76. 
 279. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1107-11 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that the 
United States can only be sued to the extent that it has waived its sovereign 
immunity, and holding that the plaintiff failed to meet her burden to establish that 
the Federal Tort Claims Act’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity covered the 
plaintiff’s reparations claim). 
 280. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
 281. Id. at 315; see also id. at 316 n.9. 
 282. See id. at 316 n.9 (stating that the Constitution requires a compensation 
remedy whenever there is a taking); id. at 316-17 and cases cited therein (supporting 
contention that constitutional law commands compensation in takings cases). 
This result has generated similar discussion in subsequent cases as well as in 
academia.  See Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1994) (stating that when taxes 
are “erroneously or illegally assessed,” the taxes should be refunded); Jack M. 
Beermann, Government Official Torts and the Takings Clause:  Federalism and State 
Sovereign Immunity, 68 B.U. L. REV. 277, 338-40 (1988) (suggesting that First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987), prevents 
sovereign immunity from barring compensation claims).  But see Richard H. Seamon, 
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It is not impossible to conceive of a takings jurisprudence that 
accords more respect to sovereign immunity, and it is certainly 
possible that sovereign immunity may surface at some point and 
create problems for any takings claims based on slavery.  However, if 
current case law is followed, sovereign immunity should not prevent 
the bringing of claims for compensation for the taking of slaves’ self-
ownership property rights. 
3. Impermissible retroactivity 
It could be argued that retroactive application of constitutional 
standards to a pre-constitutional time period is improper because 
slave statutes in the original colonies predated the Constitution.  
However, courts generally reject such defenses and rulings of a 
constitutional nature are commonly applied retroactively.283  As the 
Supreme Court has emphasized, “Both the common law and 
[Supreme Court] decisions have recognized a general rule of 
retrospective effect for the constitutional decisions of this Court.  
Nothing in the Constitution alters the fundamental rule of 
retrospective operation that has governed judicial decisions for 
almost a thousand years.”284  Takings decisions change the state of the 
law, and citizens and governments are expected to conform 
accordingly.285 
Takings Clause jurisprudence currently includes many concepts 
not envisioned by the Framers, such as regulatory takings.286  Judicial 
                                                          
The Asymmetry of State Sovereign Immunity, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1067, 1072-80 (2001) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court has not conclusively decided whether sovereign 
immunity prevents unconsenting states from being sued for Takings Clause 
violations). 
 283. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 94 (1993) (noting that 
Supreme Court rulings, when interpreting federal law, must be applied retroactively 
to all cases still open on direct review); James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 
U.S. 529, 544 (1991) (“When the Court has applied a rule of law to the litigants in 
one case it must do so with respect to all others not barred by procedural 
requirements or res judicata.”). 
 284. Harper, 509 U.S. at 94. 
 285. In most civil cases, including takings cases, the correct standard for a court to 
apply is whether an action would be a compensable taking under a modern 
understanding of the clause, rather than whether it was understood to be 
compensable at the time of the taking.  Numerous takings cases, such as Mahon and 
Penn Central, altered the status of the law in significant ways.  For example, Mahon 
first established the principle of regulatory takings.  See supra notes 114-115.  Penn 
Central approved of groundbreaking laws, countenancing a rather invasive 
confiscation on the grounds that in-kind compensation was acceptable, harm was not 
inappropriately targeted, and reciprocity of advantage applied.  Penn Cent. Transp. 
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (holding that there was no taking where 
the government precluded a property owner from building on his property because 
it was designated as a historical landmark). 
 286. See Treanor, supra note 11, at 849-55 (stating that while compensation for 
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acceptance of the regulatory takings doctrine illustrates that the 
Takings Clause has not been interpreted to be circumscribed by the 
relatively narrow boundaries understood by the Framers.  Slavery 
does present a particularly special case, a taking that occurred 
centuries before any possible remedy, but it can still be addressed 
using modern understandings of takings.287 
The fact that a statute predated the Constitution is not sufficient to 
immunize it from constitutional requirements.  Presumably, a state 
assumed the responsibility of bringing its laws into accord with the 
new Constitution upon ratification.288  Thus, state statutes allowing 
slavery would trigger takings compensation since states had ratified 
the new Constitution. 
While states were not bound by the Bill of Rights until its 
incorporation, which happened well after the abolition of slavery,289 
the federal government has always been bound by the Bill of Rights.  
As a result, federal acquiescence in the taking of slaves may be a 
compensable taking.  Holding the states accountable for violation of 
the federal Takings Clause is not such a stretch either.  First, many 
states have takings clauses of their own.290  Second, the failure to 
compensate for the prior taking continues to this day—well past 
incorporation of the Takings Clause.  These arguments provide at 
least a colorable claim for holding the states accountable for Takings 
Clause violations even prior to incorporation. 
In addition, Keith Hylton argues that modern legal standards can 
be applied to slavery because slavery is properly viewed not as a law-
sanctioned regime but “as a corruption or displacement of the law.”291  
Consequently, applying today’s law to slavery should not be seen as 
the retroactive application of law to slavery, but rather as “bringing 
                                                          
regulatory takings was not implicitly disagreed with by the Constitution, it was 
explicitly rejected by the Framers in discussion). 
 287. Applying a modern understanding of takings, of course, would allow 
compensation for claims brought under a theory of regulatory takings based on the 
initial slave laws.  If a claim is to be brought under a derivative takings theory, as 
suggested above, this problem is less serious; any derivative takings claim would be 
based on the effects of slavery on modern-day slave descendants, and, therefore, 
would presumably apply modern understandings of the Takings Clause. 
 288. States that did not ratify the Constitution assumed this responsibility once the 
Constitution became operative through its ratification. 
 289. See FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 65-66 (noting that the Takings Clause was 
incorporated to apply to state governments in 1897 with Chicago, Burlington & Quincy 
Railroad Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), in which the Supreme Court held that a 
railroad right of way constituted a taking). 
 290. See id. at 65 (noting that the constitutions of every state except New 
Hampshire and North Carolina contain versions of a takings clause). 
 291. See HYLTON, supra note 137, at 11. 
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law to a regime from which [law] had been entirely displaced.”292  
Hylton argues that slaveowners’ insistence on the non-applicability of 
laws to slaves was itself part of their offense.293  Such application, while 
retroactive, would be limited to cases involving “institution[s] . . . 
founded on the absence of law.”294 
In summary, retroactive application of Takings Clause 
compensation requirements suffers from the problems common to 
retroactive application of any law.  However, these considerations are 
no more convincing here than in other instances where retroactive 
application of law is deemed acceptable and should not be 
considered a barrier to takings compensation. 
V. TAKINGS CLAIMS IN THE REPARATIONS FRAMEWORK:  PRACTICAL 
APPLICATIONS 
A. Taking Takings to the Courts 
This Article has argued that slavery contains the elements of a 
Takings Clause violation.  In any lawsuit for just compensation based 
on slavery, it would be necessary to establish as a legal matter that self-
ownership is a compensable property right, and that slavery was a 
taking of that right.   
Advocates could start by bringing lawsuits against the state 
governments of states that enacted laws allowing slavery.  These suits 
would likely be brought in conjunction with other claims, such as 
equal protection claims and tort-based reparations claims.  Takings 
claims could also be added as amendments to complaints in existing 
reparations litigation against the government. 
Suits against states could bring attorneys general to the bargaining 
table for settlement discussions.  Should they proceed to jury verdicts, 
they could also result in compensation for the taking.  However, the 
possibility of varied or contradictory judgments would complicate 
suits against states. 
Suit could also be brought against the federal government.  A 
federal suit could avoid some problems that might arise in state suits, 
such as issues arising from the non-incorporation of the Takings 
                                                          
 292. Id. at 3. 
 293. Id. at 3, 6-7.  Hylton argues that what made slavery a special institution is not 
the government regulations that supported slavery, but rather the lack of regulations.  
Id. at 6.  This argument implies an abdication of the government’s Hobbesian role in 
controlling bad actors.  See id.; see also MODERN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 47, at 51-55 
(discussing Hobbesian conception of the role of government). 
 294. HYLTON, supra note 137, at 10.  “The limiting principle is suggested by the 
special legal status that the institution claimed for itself.”  Id. 
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Clause at the time of the takings.  It would also introduce new issues; 
the federal government, while it participated in slavery, never 
participated to the extent that state governments did.  As such, the 
action of the taking might be harder to establish at the federal level.  
As with the states, any suit brought against the federal government 
should probably be pursued in conjunction with other related claims, 
such as Fourteenth Amendment claims and traditional tort-based 
reparation claims.295 
B. Taking Takings to the Legislature 
Takings arguments can also be raised in the legislative arena, 
where reparations efforts have thus far been unsuccessful.  
Reparations advocates could emphasize to Congress and the country 
that slaves were kidnapped and their property rights of self-ownership 
taken in violation of the Takings Clause.  They could highlight the 
hypocrisy of Madison and others in suggesting that slave owners—
poor, helpless, victimized slave owners—should receive compensation 
for the “taking” of emancipation.  Advocates could use the takings 
argument to buttress other arguments in favor of reparations, 
affirmative action, and government investment in improving Black 
lives.296 
The moral weight of the takings argument, combined with the 
many other arguments already enlisted by reparations supporters, 
could influence Congress to more closely examine the question of 
reparations, both in the traditional and in the takings context.297  
                                                          
 295. To bring a suit, plaintiffs would need a representative who has standing.  This 
could be accomplished by locating a slave descendant to act as a lead plaintiff.  See 
Aiyetoro, supra note 265, at 467-69 (proposing that standing could be established by 
claiming that the U.S. government failed to eliminate, under the Thirteenth 
Amendment, the badges and indicia of slavery). 
 296. Cf. Jack Greenberg, Affirmative Action in Higher Education:  Confronting the 
Condition and Theory, 43 B.C. L. REV. 521, 575-80 (2002) (proposing that affirmative 
action programs can be seen as a form of reparations); Brief of Amici Curiae The 
National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America (N’COBRA) and The 
National Conference of Black Lawyers (NCBL) in Support of Respondents at 12-17, 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (Nos. 02-241 & 02-516) (arguing that the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit affirmative action in education to serve as 
a reparation for slavery). 
 297. Some scholars have suggested that resolution of mass claims through the 
political process avoids inefficiencies inherent in the judicial system.  See, e.g., 
Richard B. Stewart, Regulatory Compliance Preclusion of Tort Liability:  Limiting the Dual-
Track System, 88 GEO. L.J. 2167, 2170 (2000) (stating that transaction costs for product 
liability and environmental claims consume as much as two-thirds of any award given 
through the court system).  But see Jack B. Weinstein, Compensation for Mass Private 
Delicts:  Evolving Roles of Administrative, Criminal, and Tort Law, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 
971-74 (2001) (suggesting that judicial resolution of compensation claims enjoys the 
benefits of flexibility, accountability, visibility, and appropriately vigorous pursuit of 
claims). 
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Legislators could use the takings argument to point out that America 
has a moral obligation to pay for the taking of slaves’ self-ownership, 
independent of any legal obligation the country has to make slaves 
whole.298  Legislative framing of the issue as a takings problem may 
make any compensation statute less susceptible to attack in court, 
given courts’ oftentimes greater protection of property rights than 
liberty rights.299  Even if legislators were unable to enact just 
compensation laws, they could possibly assist a takings suit to proceed 
more smoothly by legislation as limited as extending the statute of 
limitations for slavery takings claims. 
C. The Value of Just Compensation 
Numerous scholars and advocates have made reparations proposals 
and a full treatment of the numerous possibilities for compensation is 
beyond the scope of this Article.  A brief examination of some 
reparations proposals suggests that they could easily be used to satisfy 
the just compensation required by the Takings Clause.  For example, 
numerous reparations scholars, such as Randall Robinson, have 
urged the creation of a fund that would provide educational and 
economic benefits to Blacks.300  Some have suggested “subclassing” 
award recipients, as in class action lawsuits, to determine appropriate 
awards.301  Other advocates, such as Congressman John Conyers, have 
                                                          
 298. For a discussion of the use of rhetoric by legislators to create public 
awareness of issues and to frame their solutions, see generally Daniel M. Filler, 
Random Violence and the Transformation of the Juvenile Justice Debate, 86 VA. L. REV. 1095, 
1096, 1110-21 (2000) (reviewing JOEL BEST, RANDOM VIOLENCE:  HOW WE TALK ABOUT 
NEW CRIMES AND NEW VICTIMS (1999), which discusses how the state uses rhetoric to 
shape public perceptions of juvenile crime and gun control); Daniel M. Filler, 
Making the Case for Megan’s Law:  A Study in Legislative Rhetoric, 76 IND. L.J. 315, 346-64 
(2001) (examining the use of child-victim stories and statistics to generate support 
for Megan’s Law). 
 299. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 373 (1993) (noting 
“a tilt by the Rehnquist Court in favor of protection of property rights and away from 
the strong preference given to personal rights by the Warren and Burger Courts”). 
 300. See ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 244-45 (discussing Robert Westley’s proposal of 
establishing a private trust, which would “be funded out of the general revenues of 
the United States to support programs” that further the education and economic 
empowerment of Blacks); see also Note, Bridging the Color Line:  The Power of African-
American Reparations to Redirect America’s Future, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1689, 1698 (2002) 
(arguing that reparations should augment existing programs by supporting 
institutions in Black communities, Black-owned businesses, and affirmative action 
programs). 
 301. See, e.g., Chisolm, supra note 5, at 721-22 (noting that since not all Blacks are 
descendant of slaves, an appropriate strategy is to treat Blacks, as a class, like an 
injured party, and then create subclasses to determine eligibility for specific 
remedies). 
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eschewed making concrete suggestions and asked for further study of 
the matter.302 
Just compensation for slavery takings could probably be designed 
in a similar manner to trust funds proposed by reparations advocates.  
In addition, just compensation could be designed based on any 
findings of committees set up to study the issue.  Fluid compensation, 
or cy pres compensation models,303 could be used based on theories 
developed in numerous mass tort cases.304  Some portion of any award 
could go to organizations, as was done in the Holocaust cases305 and 
the Agent Orange case.306  It is also possible that other valid 
approaches exist.  The problem is certainly complex, as is distribution 
                                                          
 302. See Commission to Study Reparation Proposals for African-Americans Act, 
H.R. 40, 107th Cong. (2001).  The bill states: 
(b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this Act is to establish a commission to— 
(1) examine the institution of slavery which existed from 1619 through 1865 
within the United States and the colonies that became the United States, 
including the extent to which the Federal and State Governments 
constitutionally and statutorily supported the institution of slavery; 
(2) examine de jure and de facto discrimination against freed slaves and 
their descendants from the end of the Civil War to the present, including 
economic, political, and social discrimination; 
(3) examine the lingering negative effects of the institution of slavery and 
the discrimination described in paragraph (2) on living African-Americans 
and on society in the United States; 
(4) recommend appropriate ways to educate the American public of the 
Commission’s findings; 
(5) recommend appropriate remedies in consideration of the Commission’s 
findings on the matters described in paragraphs (1) and (2); and 
(6) submit to the Congress the results of such examination, together with 
such recommendations. 
 303. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts defines the cy pres doctrine as follows: 
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose, 
and it is or becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to carry out the 
particular purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more general intention to 
devote the property to charitable purposes, the trust will not fail but the 
court will direct the application of the property to some charitable purpose 
which falls within the general charitable intention of the settlor. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959).  See generally Note, Damage 
Distribution in Class Actions:  The Cy Pres Remedy, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 448 (1972) 
(describing how the cy pres doctrine can be applied to class action law suits). 
 304. See, e.g., Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1305 
(9th Cir. 1990) (noting that “[f]ederal courts have frequently approved [cy pres 
awards] in the settlement of class actions where the proof of individual claims would 
be burdensome or the distribution of damages costly”). 
 305. See In re Holocaust Victim Asset Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 140 (E.D.N.Y. 
2000) (granting final approval of a $1.25 billion settlement agreement after 
determining that it reflected “a fair, reasonable, and adequate compromise,” even 
though specific information about individual recoveries was not yet discovered). 
 306. See generally PETER SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL:  MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN 
THE COURTS 206-23 (1987) (providing an in-depth analysis of the Agent Orange 
litigation and explaining the compensation scheme crafted by the court, which 
among other things, gave millions of dollars to veterans’ organizations for legal, 
medical, and social services). 
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of any compensation.307  As with other compensation schemes, the 
logistical problems of victim identification and award distribution 
should not prove fatal to restitution.308 
One compensation issue unique to takings claims is that courts 
generally award market price for takings.309  However, there is no 
market for self-ownership, which is an inalienable good.310  Given this 
difficulty, it is probably appropriate instead to compensate based on 
disgorgement of unjust enrichment.311 
An alternative might be to base compensation on the market value 
of the labor (i.e., what slaveowners would have had to pay in the 
absence of slavery).  That value could serve as a minimum, with a 
premium added to reflect the fact that the labor was involuntary. 
The calculation of appropriate compensation could use the 
economic valuations of life as set out in economic studies.312  The 
                                                          
 307. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 297, at 971 (discussing how courts use fluid 
recovery to deal with the problems of mass tort claims, such as with aggregated 
settlements, compensation-administration plans, and insurance type installment 
payment programs); David Chen, Defining Limit of Generosity for 9/11 Fund, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 14, 2002, at 25 (noting the difficulties in formulating disbursement awards from 
the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund as well as the fact that many families 
believe the awards, though potentially in excess of $20 million,  do not fairly value a 
person’s worth and lost income). 
 308. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 153, at 702 (noting that despite any 
purported problems with slave reparations, the problems—and solutions—are no 
different than other complex cases such as “wrongful life” cases wherein the people 
bringing the claim would not exist if not for the wrongdoing). 
 309. See, e.g., United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984) (holding 
that just compensation is measured by the market value of the property at the time of 
the taking, unless the market value is too difficult to find or would lead to injustice, 
because market prices are easily determined and generally reliable). 
 310. Market price in the slavery context could arguably be established through 
examining prices of slave sales.  However, that market is almost certainly 
undercompensatory.  Slave market prices reflect only the property’s value after the 
taking.  Since the value of property is adversely affected by the taking, such ex post 
market valuations may undervalue the property. 
The problem of properly valuing slave labor is exacerbated by the fact that, prior 
to the government action allowing slavery, the market in question did not exist.  The 
government taking (and corollary gift to private property owners) created an entirely 
new market.  See generally POSNER, supra note 172, at 65 (discussing the problems that 
arise when market value results from government action). 
 311. See Sebok, supra note 62, at 651-57 (discussing unjust enrichment in the 
reparations context).  The Supreme Court has stated that: 
[A]n exception to the normal measure of just compensation is required 
[where] fair market value is not ascertainable.  Such cases, for the most part, 
involve properties that are seldom, if ever, sold in the open market.  Under 
those circumstances, we cannot predict whether the prices previously paid, 
assuming there have been prior sales, would be repeated in a sale of the 
condemned property. 
50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. at 29-30 (internal quotations omitted). 
 312. Professor Kip Viscusi has written extensively about the economic valuation of 
life.  See W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 697-701 (2d 
ed. 1995) (stating that an implicit value of life ranges from $1 million to $6 million); 
W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1912, 1930 
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value in such studies for death is about $5 million to $7 million—that 
is, people tend to value their life at about that rate.313  If that amount 
is accepted as the value of life, then the value of self-ownership is 
presumably some fraction of that amount. 
In sum, though compensation would raise many issues, much of 
the groundwork for distribution, including examining and discussing 
various payment options, has already been set out in the reparations 
literature.  One question unique to takings claims—how to 
approximate market price for inalienable property—is adequately 
resolved by instead using either disgorgement analysis or market 
value of labor. 
VI. WHAT TAKINGS CLAIMS ADD TO THE REPARATIONS MODEL 
The Takings Clause gives reparation advocates a new theory to 
argue for compensation for slavery.  It has both advantages and 
disadvantages as compared with the traditional tort-based reparations 
model. 
A major advantage, as noted above,314 is that the Takings Clause 
arguably is not subject to the defense of sovereign immunity.  This is 
especially significant because the only reparations case to date to 
make it to the appellate level, Cato v. United States, foundered on 
precisely those grounds.315 
Takings claims may also be less susceptible to the defenses of 
attenuation, which have plagued traditional tort-based claims.  
Attenuation has been a great bugbear for reparations claims.  Tort 
law in general is reluctant to recognize claims of harm that are 
attenuated rather than direct.316  Tort theory has trouble explaining 
                                                          
(1993) [hereinafter Viscusi, Value of Risks] (arguing that the value of life of a U.S. 
airline passenger averages about $5 million); cf. POSNER, supra note 172, at 214-17 
(discussing economic valuation of death using insurance and risk, and the drawbacks 
of that method).  Viscusi’s approach to valuation of life has been criticized by some 
scholars.  See David A. Hoffman & Michael P. O’Shea, Can Law and Economics Be Both 
Practical and Principled?, 53 ALA. L. REV. 335, 395-98 (2002) (noting that the economic 
analysis and decision-making that Viscusi suggests that corporations should utilize is 
offensive to the public and results in higher awards being implemented by jurors 
against such corporations). 
 313. See Viscusi, Value of Risks, supra note 312 (concluding in 1993 that the value of 
life was $5 million).  Adjusted for inflation, it would now be worth a little over $6 
million.  Id. 
 314. See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing application of the defense of sovereign 
immunity to takings claims for slavery). 
 315. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that, 
inter alia, the plaintiff’s claims fell outside the United States’ limited waiver of 
sovereign immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act). 
 316. See HYLTON, supra note 137, at 2, 35-38 (discussing how courts limit defendant 
liability through the use of procedures like foreseeability and proximate cause).  See 
generally J. Mark Appleberry, Note, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress:  A Focus on 
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how claims made many years after a crime can meet all of the 
elements of a tort.317  Tort actions seeking tort compensation for 
claims bridging generations have not generally been successful.318  For 
example, in the DES mass tort case, the court did not award damages 
to granddaughters, finding that the harm was too attenuated.319  In 
the Holocaust cases, which also dealt with slave labor, the primary 
concern was in dealing with the victims themselves.320  Importantly, 
there was not an overwhelming degree of attenuation between the 
crime and the settlement in the Holocaust cases.321 
Slavery reparations claims, in contrast, bring a large degree of 
attenuation—a generational gap.  However, the Supreme Court 
clarified that “the Takings Clause does not have ‘an expiration date’” 
in its ruling allowing property owners who acquire title after the 
enactment of a regulation to bring takings claims.322 
While takings claims have often been prosecuted as torts, they are 
not solely rooted in the tort law tradition.323  Since takings claims 
                                                          
Relationships, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 301, 304, 314-22 (1995) (arguing that rules limiting 
tort claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress create an arbitrary cutoff and 
that a better rule would focus on the relationship between the parties). 
 317. See KEITH N. HYLTON, A FRAMEWORK FOR REPARATIONS CLAIMS 5-7 (Boston 
Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 03-05, 2003) (arguing 
that because of the passage of time, tort claims for slave reparations suffers from the 
problem of identifying class members and establishing causation), available at 
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/papers/pdf_files/HyltonK033103.pdf (on file with 
the American University Law Review); see also HYLTON, supra note 137, at 38-40 
(noting the difficulty in determining the value of slave labor due to the fact that 
slaves were not compensated, and discussing the trouble in figuring out what the 
appropriate value would be to current generations).  Jeremy Waldron has argued 
that the indeterminacy of such claims weighs against their viability.  Jeremy Waldron, 
Superseding Historical Injustice, 103 ETHICS 4, 6-27 (1992); cf. HYLTON, supra note 137, at 
48-50, 53-56 (suggesting that rejecting reparation claims on moral grounds, as 
argued by Waldron, fails to recognize both the continuing impact of slavery on 
current society, and that those who benefited from slavery should be required to pay 
compensation). 
 318. But cf. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 153, at 700 (noting that some 
reparation schemes allow payments to descendents based on the fact that when the 
property was expropriated the takers knew they were injuring future generations). 
 319. See Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198, 203 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that, 
although the effects of DES could extend for generations, the court must limit 
liability to those who took the drug so that the amount of compensation would be 
manageable). 
 320. In re Holocaust Victim Asset Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 143 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(approving settlement and distribution plan for those “recognized as targets of 
systematic Nazi persecution”). 
 321. The settlement was approved in July, 2000, approximately six decades after 
the Holocaust began.  Id. 
 322. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001) (asserting that future 
successors to property may challenge unreasonable land use limitations, or else 
“postenactment transfer of title would absolve the State of its obligation to defend 
any action restricting land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable”). 
 323. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 716-17 (1999) (noting 
that takings claims were brought as both torts and as quasi-contracts cause of 
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originate in property, an argument can be made that they do not 
require the same showing of proximate cause as traditional torts.  In 
addition, if theories of derivative takings or continuous takings are 
approved, there is no attenuation to be raised because the injury is 
current.  Similarly, takings jurisprudence allows a claim to be brought 
despite the fact that some slaves receive their property interest—i.e. 
were born—after the imposition of laws removing that interest.324  
Takings claims on behalf of slavery victims and their descendants may 
thus avoid some of the difficulties that have plagued tort-based 
reparations actions. 
In addition to specific legal differences, takings claims also have 
the benefit of drawing from a different legal history and tradition 
than tort claims and appealing to a different demographic.  While 
tort claims for reparation are based on harm to liberty and human 
rights325—pillars of liberal and critical thought—takings claims would 
be based on a property deprivation—a pillar of libertarian thought.  
This difference could impact just how compensation claims are 
viewed in increasingly more conservative courts.326   To the extent that 
a Takings Clause argument can expand the base of support for 
compensation for slavery, it serves a vital function.327   
Enlisting the Takings Clause to address the harm of slavery also 
encourages healthy cross-pollination of legal ideas.  Great benefits 
could result from Takings Clause scholars and reparations scholars 
working together to address the historic injustice of slavery takings. 
Finally, takings claims provide another opportunity to raise these 
issues in a judicial forum.  Every time these claims are raised, there is 
a chance they will succeed, as well as a chance that defendants will 
choose to settle.  Even if takings claims are as much of a long shot as 
traditional tort-based reparations claims, two long shots are better 
than one. 
It is clear that takings claims present a unique set of difficulties.  
Specifically, they require the establishment of a property right of self-
                                                          
actions). 
 324. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630 (holding that a takings claim is not barred simply 
because an owner took title of the property after the regulation was enacted). 
 325. See HYLTON, supra note 137, at 2-3 (noting that potential claims under tort law 
could include “social torts” such as deprivation of status and the denial of religious 
freedom). 
 326. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Understanding the Rehnquist Court:  An Admiring Reply to 
Professor Merrill, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 659, 659-75 (2003) (discussing the conservative 
nature of the Rehnquist Court). 
 327. See Boris I. Bittker & Roy L. Brooks, The Constitutionality of Black Reparations, in 
WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 3, at 374, 385 (noting that “a judicial 
resolution of . . . legal questions surrounding black reparations might well turn on 
public policy considerations”). 
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ownership.328  They also run against problems of possible 
constitutional endorsement, mentioned earlier.329  Plus, the more 
promising takings arguments are based on new applications of 
takings law, such as derivative takings, that have not yet been 
approved by courts.  Finally, Takings Clause claims can only be 
brought against the government, not private actors. 
Takings Clause arguments, then, are not a silver bullet that can 
remedy every problem presented by compensation claims.  Rather, 
they provide an additional tool for the reparations advocate.  This 
tool could be fruitful, especially as legal theories are further 
developed to avoid the problems associated with takings claims. 
CONCLUSION 
The taking of slaves’ self-ownership should be viewed as a 
compensable act under the Takings Clause.  The idea has intuitive 
appeal—if slaves did not suffer a taking, who did?  The argument also 
creates a kindlier, more reasonable persona for the Takings Clause, 
which unfortunately until now has only been associated with slavery 
through arguments favoring compensation for slaveowners. 
Slavery looks in many ways like a prima facie taking.  Unique 
problems certainly exist in takings analysis, when applied to slavery.  
However, impetus for overcoming these problems can be found in 
the strong parallels to the purposes of the Takings Clause and the 
policy behind reparations.  The argument that slavery violated the 
Takings Clause violation can be employed before courts and 
legislatures to expand the debate on reparations, and to help attain 
just compensation for millions of takings victims. 
 
                                                          
 328. Supra Part I. 
 329. Supra Part IV.B. 
